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INTRODUCTION

Compulsory unitization of oil and natural gas reservoirs would substantially enhance the welfare of the United States and of Texas in
particular.' The present regulated free market for oil production pro* B.A., Baylor; J.D. University of Texas at Austin; Associate Professor, Business Law
Faculty.
* B.A., University of Kansas; J.D. Harvard School of Law; Associate Professor Business
Law Faculty.
1. 1 RAYMOND

M.

MYERS, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION: VOLUNTARY-

1099
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duces both inefficiencies and inequities. As a consequence, oil exploration is discouraged, oil production is unnecessarily costly and
wasteful, and the private distribution of oil revenues can be arbitrarily
unfair. Compulsory unitization would remedy many of these shortcomings which result from extant structures.
In this context, the term "unitization" means the cooperative development of an entire reservoir of oil or gas. Many different individuals
are likely to have some ownership interest in the oil reservoir, and
unitization is distinguished from non-cooperative independent individual development of the resources. Another form of cooperative
joint development is known as "pooling," but pooling typically covers
a relatively small area-less than the entire reservoir.
The primary virtue of unitization is the improved efficiency of oil
production.' This enhanced efficiency is an important objective to
pursue. One leading economist in the area, Professor Stephen McDonald, observed that "[t]he economic efficiency with which we exploit our petroleum resources is of interest to everyone in the United
States, for it helps determine the level of well-being of each of us."'
While economic efficiency is generally a presumptively valuable end
for government action, productive efficiency may be unusually important in the case of oil and gas production.
Oil and gas production is vital to the economy and creates benefits
to society above and beyond the benefits to producers and consumers.
Maintaining a strong domestic production capability is vital to national security.' Oil imports are higher than ever 5 and are projected
COMPULSORY 1 (2d ed. 1967). Myers states "The consolidation of oil and gas leases or other
mineral interests in a field or common source of supply, or a substantial portion thereof, is
generally referred to as 'unitization' as distinguished from the word 'pooling,' which is applied
to such interests covering comparatively small tracts." Id.
2. See text section II, THE CONTEXT FOR POOLING AND UNITIZATION.
3. STEPHEN L. McDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 2 (1971).

4. See, e.g., US. Energy Security, Hearings on H. 361 Before the Subcomm. on Energy
and Power, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1987) (statement of Secretary of Energy Herrington).
Herrington contends that "the weakening of our domestic oil infrastructure holds the potential
for significant detrimental ramifications for energy security" and that "our energy security is
linked to the fate and fortunes of our domestic petroleum industry through this century"; J.H.
LICHTBLAU, OIL AND AMERICA'S SECURITY

36 (1988) (stating that "the United States is

moving toward another energy crisis simply because it faces greater foreign oil dependency").
5. See Wendall H. Ford, Energy Policy, the Environment, and Congress, PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, March 16, 1989, 14, 15 (noting that oil imports now exceed those of 1973
oil crisis).
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to increase in the future.6 Domestic production has become a matter
of particular concern, because oil production in the United States has
steadily decreased over the past five years. 7 In addition, increased oil
and gas production remains especially important to the Texas
economy.8
Notwithstanding the importance of efficient oil and gas production,
prevailing economic structures create considerable inefficiency. This
system enables each individual to extract petroleum or natural gas
resulting in an anarchic free-for-all that bears little resemblance to the
free market for most goods. Unitization of oil fields will treat the
cause of the market problem and cure the most serious inefficiencies.
At the same time, unitization also offers a more equitable distribution
of oil revenues. Economists have suggested that "all of the significant
evils of unregulated petroleum production sprang from flexible adjustment of current versus future recovery under changing
circumstances".
By holding out to explorers the prospect of being able to develop
and produce new discoveries on the most economical terms, unitization would encourage exploration. Unitization would also contribute
to solving the problem, now referred to as the "energy crisis"-the
problem of equating supplies of oil and gas with growing demand in
the years ahead. Unitization would also result in true protection of
correlative rights and would allow us to dispense with all of the elaborate and expensive machinery of present detailed regulation, leaving
only that necessary to restrain drilling and production in the preunitization period of information-gathering and to protect the environ-

6. See George B. Crist, Soviet Expansion, in 54 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY 514, 515
(1988). "A Department of Energy study estimates that our imports could double over the next
ten years, eventually accounting for one-half or more of total projected U.S. oil consumption."

Id.
7. See Matthew L. Wald, Oil Activity Has Shifted From U.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1990,
at 43. Wald notes that domestic production has fallen seventeen percent since 1986 and is
projected to drop an additional three to four percent in 1990. Id. The future problem will be
compounded because the nation's largest oil field at Prudhoe Bay, Alaska has already begun to
decline in production. INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMMISSION, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 43

(1989).
8. While the percentage of the Texas economy dependent upon oil and gas has steadily
decreased over the past 15 years, such production remains the source of over 15% of the state's
gross domestic product. Interview with Gary Price of Texas Controller of Public Accounts,
(August 15, 1990) (citing results of Texas economic model database). See also HOUSTON
POST, July 30, 1988, at E3 (quoting Texas Railroad Commissioner John Sharp to the effect
that natural gas is the key to rebuilding Texas' economy).
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ment from drilling and producing activities. 9 Society has foregone
many of these benefits for decades. As recoverable oil and gas supplies dwindle, however, the benefits of unitization become more vital
for the welfare of Texas and the nation. Adoption of a strong and
effective compulsory unitization statute is increasingly essential.
II.

THE CONTEXT FOR POOLING AND UNITIZATION

To appreciate of the significance of unitization one must have at
least an elementary understanding of geological principles and traditional property law. Problems arise because geology does not follow
Blackstone. Traditional structures of private property rights conflict
with the physical characteristics of oil and natural gas reserves, thus
producing inefficiency.
Reserves of petroleum and natural gas are found under pressure in
fractured underground rock formations.' 0 The rock creates an essentially impermeable seal around the petroleum or natural gas reservoir
which traps the liquid or gas in place.I The reservoirs may assume a
variety of forms, but these differences have relatively little importance
for our purposes. Significantly, petroleum reservoirs typically contain
2
water and natural gas in addition to the oil.'
The underground pools of oil can assume many shapes or sizes.
Some stretch horizontally, parallel to the upper ground, while others
fill vertical fractures, perpendicular to the land's surface. Some oil
reservoirs are extremely large, stretching many miles in length. A
single reservoir may underlie the surface property of scores of
landowners.
Oil exploration is a search for these underground reservoirs. When
a well is drilled and reaches an oil reservoir, the pressure in the reservoir forces the oil up the well where it can be recovered and used.
However, oil itself compresses poorly and yields little of the pressure
vital to its extraction. Fortunately, the natural gas or water usually
found with the oil is much more easily compressed, and will produce
9. WALLACE

F. LovEJoy

& PAUL

T.

HOMAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF OIL CONSERVA-

REGULATION 77 (1967) (quoting Professor Stephen McDonald).
10. See Robert L. Mellen III, Note, Compulsory Unitization in Florida: A New Emphasis
in the Energy Crisis, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 196, 198-99 (1974).
11. See generally Stephen L. McDonald, Unit Operation of Oil Reservoirs as an Instrument of Conservation, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 305, 305-06 (1973).
TION

12.
(1986).

JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS
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the pressure necessary for oil recovery. In essence, the pressurized
gas or water expels the oil and expands to fill the void left by the
expelled oil. The amount of such pressure depends on many factors,
including the quantity of water or gas; the shape of the reservoir; and
the location of the oil, gas, and water found therein. These characteristics of oil reservoirs and pressure-driven production are ill-suited for
classical private property concepts.
Historically, the owner of the surface land presumptively owned all
the ground under his or her land (unless otherwise alienated). A
landowner therefore theoretically owned the amount of oil underlying
his or her land in the natural, or original state. This property rights
system is generally known as the "rule of capture."' 3 This approach
to private property works reasonably well for solid minerals that remain in place but creates problems when dealing with liquids or gases
14
that can flow from one underground zone to another.
A simple, representative example will demonstrate the problems
with traditional property law concepts. Suppose that an oil field underlies the rural property of fifteen different individuals. Under the
rule of capture, one property owner could drill a well on his or her
own property and drain all the extractable oil or gas from the reservoir. As the first owner produced oil, the reservoir pressure would
cause the remaining oil to flow from under the neighbors' land, to
under the driller's land and then up the well. If the original position,
of the parties is accepted as equitable, the driller is legally stealing the
neighbors' oil by drawing it from beneath his neighbor's land. The
relative ability to do this is dependent on structural geological principles that are not necessarily related to the amount of oil originally
underlying a piece of land. This is because "the expansion of gas or
water drives the oil laterally as well as vertically in the reservoir, so
that some wells initially producing oil gradually become gas or water
producers as the gas-oil or water-oil interface passes them," while
other wells "lying in the direction in which oil is driven produce

13. For the early development of the rule of capture from traditional property law, see
Westmoreland and Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. Dewitt, 18 A. 724 (Pa. 1889). See generally
John C. LaMaster, Consent Requirements in Compulsory Fieldwide Unitization, 46 LA. L.

REV. 843 (1986) (summarizing the rule of capture).
14. See Granville Dutton, A Summary of Statutory Pooling in Various States, THE
LANDMAN, May 1985, at 35 (noting that surface property lines do not stop the flow of hydrocarbons through reservoirs).
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more-sometimes many times more."1 5
The owner of even a tiny tract of land, if located strategically atop
an oil field, might theoretically extract all the available oil from an
immense amount of surrounding acreage. This is not theft, however,
as property owners have no vested property right in oil beneath their
property that may subsequently migrate to the property of others.
Informed neighbors will realize that their potentially lucrative oil
reserves are being drained away. The interests of the neighbors are
often referred to as "correlative rights," but the interests are not
rights in a legal sense. The traditional legal rules did not permit the
neighbors to halt the driller's operations, nor could the neighbors
compel the driller to share in the recovered oil. The neighbors only
recourse in order to protect their own oil reserves was to drill quickly
themselves and drain as much of the oil as they could, before it was
lost to others. An early Pennsylvania decision observed:
every landowner or his lessee may locate his wells wherever he pleases,
regardless of the interests of others .... He may crowd the adjoining
farms so as to enable him to draw the oil and gas from them.16 What,
then, can the neighbor do? Nothing, only go and do likewise.
The need to "go and do likewise" can produce a mad rush to drill and
extract as much oil as possible:
The owner (or lessee) of the original location can protect his initial title
only by drilling wells and taking possession of the petroleum in place
before it is drained away by wells on neighboring land. In consequence
of the rule of capture, the process of unregulated development and exploitation of petroleum deposits tends to be a race for possession by
competitive operators.' 7
Under this
much and
something,
ered by an

system, where everyone overlying an oil reservoir drills as
as quickly as possible, all property owners may recover
but there is no close correspondence between the oil recovindividual landowner and the amount of oil originally un-

15. Stephen L. McDonald, Unit Operationa/Oil Reserviors as an Instrumentof Conservation, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 305, 306 (1973).

16. Barnard v. Monongahela Gas Co., 65 A. 801 (Pa. 1907).
17. STEPHEN L. MCDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 31 (1971); see also WALLACE F. LovEaov & PAUL T. HOMAN,
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF OIL CONSERVATION REGULATIONS 21 (1967). Lovejoy and Homan

explain: "Where a number of operators are producing independently from a common source
of supply without regulations of any sort, the rational behavior of each will be to drill and
produce as rapidly as possible in order to avoid being drained by his neighbor."
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derlying that person's property. Thus, the rules did not particularly
conform to the equitable goal of assigning oil rights in proportion to
the oil underlying a piece of land. Instead, each rights owner had an
incentive to drill and capture or seize as much of the oil reservoir as
physically possible.
The above described free market rule of capture also had further
perverse efficiency consequences in a form often known as the "prisoners' dilemma." This game theory construct describes a situation
where multiple parties can all mutually gain from cooperation but
where any individual party may gain even more by being a single
hold-out from cooperation. In our present context, consider a small
reservoir overlain equally by three rights owners. While the following
scenario is necessarily simplified, it is adequately representative of the
problems created by traditional rules. Assume that the total recoverable oil from the reservoir is expressed by 3B." The total costs of
extracting this oil are represented by 3C. 9 If the reservoir is a proven
one, and its oil resources are readily accessible, 3B will exceed 3C by a
significant margin, yielding significant net profits to the three owners.
If the three rights owners cooperate and share equally, the production, costs and profits will be borne as follows:
1) B- C
2) B -C
3) B -C
While this yields an efficient result and significant profit to each rights
owner, the desire to maximize individual profits can cause the system
to break down. Suppose that rights owner number 1 decides to increase its revenues by increased drilling (doubling its efforts). This
alters the allocation of benefits and costs and yields the following
breakdown:

18. Given the uncertainty of oil drilling, benefits may often be expressed as the
probability of success (p) multiplied by the potential benefits of success (B). The probability
term is subsumed in our definition of B-the term B is already discounted by probability of
failure. This is done for purposes of illustrative simplicity and because in many proven reservoirs the probability of success is virtually certain. Defining total benefits as 3B, rather than
simply B, does not effect the equation and is also done for ease of illustration.
19. The costs of oil production, expressed as 3C, do not represent some unalterable cost
of oil production. As will be seen below, vastly different costs may be required to extract any
given quantity of oil. For purposes of the illustration, 3C represents the most efficient, least

costly method for producing the 3B of oil.
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The first rights owner has decreased his profit rate but, depending on
other assumptions, may have significantly increased his overall profits.2" In so doing, he has reduced the overall recovery of the other
two owners, as well as their rates of return. While total benefits cannot exceed the physically-defined 3B total oil resources, the extraction
cost for these resources has increased from 3C to 4C, with an additional one-third of original efficient total cost, which is pure economic
waste.
Now suppose that the second rights owner likewise doubles its
drilling, while the third owner continues to act in a "cooperative"
manner. The result is:
1) 1.2B - 2C
2)
1.2B - 2C
.6BC
3)
Here, the profit rate for all three rights owners continues to drop, and
the third owner suffers even more for continuing to cooperate. Significantly, while excess drilling by any party reduces the rate of return
from the reservoir, the reduction in the rate of return is shared by all
other rights owners as well. Thus, an individual can expand his or her
total return, while forcing the neighbors to share in the reduced rate
of return.
Now assume that all of the three rights owners cease cooperating
and double their drilling efforts in order to seize the maximum recovery. The consequences can be expressed as:
1)
2)
3)

B - 2C
B - 2C
B - 2C

We are now back to the original allocation of benefits recovery, but
each owner must spend twice the original costs to achieve this same
recovery level. Each suffers a significantly reduced rate of return, and
society suffers a net efficiency loss of 3C by expending twice the neces20. One might question why rights owner number I would suffer a decreased rate of
return on his investment, even for the benefit of greater total profits. His action is logical
though, so long as the profit rate continues to be higher than he could receive from some
alternative expenditure of C.
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sary costs of recovery. While the reservoir will be drained much
faster during this last scenario than it was in the original scenario, this
fact is unlikely to compensate for the substantial increase in withdrawal costs. While a barrel of oil produced today will ordinarily be
worth more to society than a barrel of oil produced a year from now,
this discounting benefit will not justify the rush to produce caused by
the rule of capture.21 The inefficient incentives created by the rule of
capture clearly produce unnecessary production costs. 22 Moreover,

the rush to produce will distort prices and disrupt markets even in the
short-run, thereby creating still greater inefficiencies.23
21. See John C. LaMaster, Consent Requirements in Compulsory Fieldwide Unitization,
46 LA. L. REV. 843, 845 (1986). The author noted that critics do not recognize that the
"possibility that the increased recovery of oil and gas at some future date may not be worth, to
producers or to society, the required sacrifice of current consumption." Id. In a time when
future oil prices are expected to decline significantly, there may be a group benefit to this
quickened extraction of the reservoir when oil prices are higher. If oil prices are ascending,
however, much of this benefit is lost. If oil prices ascend in the future at a rate higher than the
discount rate, the inefficiency is even greater than that suggested by the scenarios. Given the
world's limited supply of oil, there is reason to believe that ascending future oil prices are a
likely event in the real world.
More importantly, unitization is the only way to ensure that oil is produced at the optimum
time. Under the free market rush, it would be an odd coincidence that production coincided
with efficiency over time. Under unitization, however, efficiency is encouraged. Professor McDonald explained:
If, given initially a benefit-maximizing distribution of production over time, expected future demand should rise relative to current demand, the corresponding rise in expected
future net proceeds would lead to an incremental shift from current to future production.
Similarly, a fall in expected future demand would lead to an incremental shift from future
to current production. In short, the definition implies that production will always shift
incrementally from periods when oil is less valuable to periods when it is more valuable,
so that the benefit-maximizing distribution of production over time is continuously sought
under changing conditions.
Stephen L. McDonald, Unit Operation of Oil Reservoir as an Instrument of Conservation, 49
NOTRE DAME LAW. 305, 310 (1973).
22. See 1 RAYMOND M. MYERS, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION: VOLUNTARY COMPULSORY 2 (2d ed. 1967). Myers states:
...[I]t has already been established that on the average the cost of producing a barrel of
oil or a cubic foot of gas under joint operations is lower than under 100 % operations.
Operating separately owned properties under the law of capture means a wasteful duplication of material and equipment. Many more wells are drilled than are necessary efficiently
to drain the reservoir.
Id. (citations omitted).
23. See STEPHEN L. McDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 32-33 (1971). Professor McDonald explains:
Under the rule of capture unmodified by regulation, production from a newly discovered
oil deposit rises quickly to a peak and then, with progressive loss of reservoir pressure,
recedes almost as quickly to a fraction of the peak level. Consequently, if an oil discovery
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These above described inefficiencies are a natural consequence of
individualized profit maximization. Indeed, as the series of scenarios
suggests, excess drilling need not necessarily result from the greedy
nature of rights owners. The fear of a greedy over-drilling neighbor
may provide sufficient reason for excessive, inefficient drilling, in order to protect one's self at least partially from the over-drilling of
others.24 The rule of capture virtually25 compelled operators to " 'git
there fustest with the mostest' wells."
The above scenarios illustrate how individual access to a jointlyheld resource can produce a very inefficient system for extraction of
that resource. This illustration deals only with the cost side of the
equation. However, individual, non-cooperative oil production will
not only increase the costs of production, but will also dissipate the
is large in relation to existing total reserves or is developed simultaneously with several
other discoveries, prices tend to be depressed during the phase of relatively high production and elevated during the subsequent phase of relatively low production. The resulting
pattern of wide and irregular price fluctuations, occasionally aggravated by cyclical shifts
in demand, may limit the recovery of petroleum from known and discoverable reservoirs.
Depressed prices not fully offset by the (discounted) expectation of elevated prices in the
future force the early abandonment of some marginal wells, reservoirs, and exploratory
prospects. By adding to business risks, wide and irregular price fluctuations may tend to
discourage the entry of new firms, reduce the availability of credit, and increase the degree
of concentration in the industry. They may thus dampen exploratory activities and in the
long run reduce the quantity of petroleum recoverable from available natural deposits.
Id.
24. See Granville Dutton, A Summary of Statutory Pooling in Various States, THE
LANDMAN, May 1985, at 35-36 n.14. Dutton argues:
Owners of the land overlying a portion of a reservoir could not avoid wasteful production
rates by limiting the number of their wells if a neighbor drilled his property to a greater
density and produced his wells at capacity. Worse still, the owners limiting their numbers
of wells would not only have the amount of recoverable hydrocarbons under their property reduced by their neighbor's wasteful practice, but would also have a portion of their
remaining recoverable hydrocarbons drained away as the fluids flowed toward the lower
pressure brought about by the excessive withdrawals.
This situation produces every incentive for any given rights owners to overproduce and no
incentive to limit production as efficiency might dictate.
Id.
25. Robert L. Mellen III, Note, Compulsory Unitization in Florida: A New Emphasis in
the Energy Crisis, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 196, 201 (1974). Mr. Mellen explains:
This common law privilege of draining a neighbor's land, and the attendant necessity of
protecting against such capture by offset wells, combined to cause much unnecessary drilling and brought about haphazard production with no relation to market requirements.
Disorderly drilling patterns resulted in great economic and physical waste, and government intervention became necessary to control the destructive self-interests of competing
landowners.
Id.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol23/iss4/6
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benefits achievable from a reservoir due to certain geological characteristics of oil fields.
The most efficient production of oil from a field requires a reservoir-specific rate of production and careful well location.2 6 This rate
is generally called the "maximum efficient rate" or "MER" of production. 27 The production rate of an oil field must be controlled to
maintain the pressure necessary to force the oil out. The location of
wells is also critical because if wells are drilled into the portion of the
reservoir containing gas or water, these wells permit escape of the
very substances that produce the pressure necessary to recover the oil.
Engineering studies can now approximate the most efficient rate of
production and well location for a particular reservoir.
Excess, uncoordinated drilling can thus reduce the overall amount
of oil recovered from a reservoir. In the above hypothetical scenario,
we assumed that the total oil extracted would be 3B, regardless of
drilling rate. In reality, excess drilling can also reduce the total
amount of recoverable oil. If we assume (albeit simplistically) that
double the efficient drilling rate can reduce the ultimately recoverable
oil by one-half, the following consequence results from our hypothetical example:
1)
2)
3)

.5B - 2C
.5B - 2C
.5B - 2C

Now, society suffers a net loss of 3C in excess costs and 1.5B in foregone benefits from inefficient, uncooperative production. Moreover,
the rate of return from production continues to decline significantly
for each individual owner even as they seek to maximize their individual profits. While some might suggest that this result is the consequence of inaccurate assumptions in our hypothetical scenarios, the

26.

JACQUELINE

L.

WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS

13

(1986).
27. See generally STEPHEN L. MCDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

18-21 (1971); see also Stephen L. McDonald, Unit

Operation of Oil Reservoirs an Instrument of Conservation, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 305, 306

(1973). McDonald explains,
If the rate of extraction exceeds some critical level, commonly known as the maximum

efficient rate or MER, gravity can no longer keep gas and water segregated from oil; these
less viscous fluids form channels through the oil to producing wells, bypassing pockets of
oil and, as produced at the wells, depleting reservoir pressure.
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real-world results of the rule of capture roughly parallel those of our
final hypothetical case:
[In 1931] William Farish, president of the Humble Oil and Refining
Company, testified that unitized pools with proper gas conservation and
repressuring could produce oil at one-fourth the cost of competitive
operations and produce 50 percent more oil per acre in the long
drilling
8
run.

2

The typical wildcat drilling and production under the rule of capture
left approximately eighty-five percent of a reservoir's oil in the
ground, beyond recovery.29 The extent of economic waste is rather
stunningly exemplified by a study that found that in the East Texas
field, producers drilled over seventeen thousand wells, when the reservoir could have been efficiently drained with only fifteen hundred
wells.3° One study estimated that during the years 1947-1952, the
state of Texas wasted one hundred million dollars on the costs of unneeded wells3 '-an amount that obviously would be far greater in
1992 dollars.
All the above scenarios took a post facto approach, after assuming
that oil and natural gas production would go forth. In addition to the
excess cost and loss of resources identified above, the pure rule of capture can create a disincentive for even efficient future production,
when viewed pre facto. As mentioned above, both social and individual efficiency would dictate drilling and production whenever B
would exceed C. Our sequence of scenarios demonstrates that for
some situations where B exceeds C, the actual return under the private market will be only .5B - 2C. Under this latter return, the rational profit maximizer will drill only when B exceeds 4C. Thus,
where B = 3C, a potentially very efficient situation for drilling and
production, free market structures under the rule of capture would
discourage such production. Professor Stephen McDonald observed
that "the certain prospect of high development costs due to dense
drilling in new reservoirs restricts the number of exploratory pros28.

STEPHEN L. McDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES:

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

29. See 1 RAYMOND

46 (1971).

M. MYERS, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION: VOLUNTARY COMPULSORY § 101 (2d ed. 1967).
30. See WALLACE F. LOvEJOY & PAUL T. HOMAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF OIL CONSERVATION REGULATION 121 (1967).

31. Robert E. Hardwicke, Oil- Well Spacing Regulations and Protectionof Property Rights
in Texas, 31 TEX. L. REV. 99, 111 n.27 (1952).
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pects worth pursuing under given price expectations and thus, in the
long run, reduces the quantity of petroleum economically recoverable
from available natural deposits."32
The dampening effect on exploration can be figuratively illustrated. 33 The horizontal axis in the following graphic depiction is labeled "prospects," which is meant to encompass the costs of
exploration, the probability of finding oil, and the costs of development in the event oil is found. As prospects improve, developers will
demand a smaller prospective rate of return, but fewer prospects will
require a greater prospective rate of return to justify exploratory activity. The curve X illustrates the rate of return required for each
given degree of prospect in an efficiently operating market. At a given
rate of return R, the optimum social amount of exploration is represented by A. As previously discussed, the inefficiencies created by
current rules for development make production more costly and less
profitable. This shifts the curve of prospective profitability left to X',
which produces an amount of exploration of A'. The difference between A' and A is a social loss of efficient exploratory activity. Thus,
absent unitization, producers will develop existing oil fields inefficiently and will fail to find and efficiently develop other oil fields.
The discouragement of exploration is particularly unfortunate, because new exploration for oil and gas in the United States is currently
at a low rate and declining.3 4
The presence of natural gas in tandem with oil creates additional
problems of cooperation, if different parties own access to the oil reservoir and the gas-cap associated with it. The owner of natural gas
rights will wish to withdraw the gas, though this will substantially
reduce the oil recoverable by reducing reservoir pressure. If the oil
rights owner gets the jump on production, it will extract the gas belonging to the gas rights owner, as a consequence of reservoir migration of the natural gas. Thus each party has a strong incentive to
produce as much oil or gas, as quickly as possible.
Traditional property rights structures produce obvious inefficien-

32. STEPHEN L. McDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES:

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 32 (1971).
33. The following description and figure are adapted from STEPHEN L. McDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 87 (1971).

34. See Matthew L. Wald, Oil Activity Has Shifted from U.S., N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1990,
at 43 (national edition) (noting that for first time, U.S. oil companies are spending more on
foreign than domestic exploration for oil).
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cies. Because each landowner has an incentive to recover as much oil
as soon as possible (before it is extracted by a neighbor), profit maximization forces the highest possible short-term production rate,
which may be far in excess of the long-term efficient production rate.
Well location will not be sensibly planned but will respond to property lines. Moreover, the various landowners are likely to drill many
more wells than necessary to drain the reservoir, thereby wasting considerable capital investment in drilling equipment.
The free market free-for-all created by the rule of capture wasted
considerable money and oil. Too much oil was pumped too fast from
too many wells. Most unfortunately, improper drilling in the early
stages of recovery prevented drillers from ever using more efficient
techniques. Once a reservoir is inefficiently tapped, much of its oil
may be lost forever.
In addition to economic and physical inefficiency, the traditional
rules were also arbitrary and inequitable. Where some property has a
structural advantage, "producers' rights to the oil originally in place
beneath their surface leases are not protected by allowing each well
draining a tract of given size to produce at the same rate as every
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Even if every property

owner produces as rapidly as possible, the resulting distribution of
ultimate oil production will bear no correlation to the amount of oil
originally beneath the property of each owner.3 6
As our scenario suggests, individual rights owners, as well as society as a whole, can benefit significantly from cooperation. 37 Unfortunately, it is known both theoretically and empirically that cooperation
will not necessarily ensue. Transaction costs may prevent cooperative
agreement, especially given the large number of rights owners from
whom cooperation may be required.3 1 Owners may find it "time-consuming and expensive to secure all the necessary signatures to a voluntary unitization agreement.1 39 Moreover, while there is a joint
interest in cooperation, any single rights owner may benefit from refusing to cooperate. Analogously, some owners, realizing that their
participation is essential to the success of the whole, may engage in
"profitable obstructionism" holding out with "exorbitant demands as
the price of their consent."'' So long as a single landowner may block
a project with substantial benefits to the group, the power to refuse to
participate "can be parlayed into the power to insist upon unjust enrichment."'" Similarly, there is an incentive to cheat on any coopera35. Stephen L. McDonald, Unit Operationof Oil Reservoirs as an Instrument of Conservation, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 305, 308 (1973).
36. See id. Noting that "[w]ells having structural advantage continue to produce long
after they have extracted all the oil originally in place beneath them-their owners thus gaining valuable property at the expense of those whose wells suffer from structural advantage."

Id.
37. In addition to the increased profits attributable to the increased efficiency described
above, unitization further benefits individuals through risk avoidance. See John C. LaMaster,
Consent Requirements in Compulsory Fieldwide Unitization, 46 LA. L. REV. 843, 845 (1986)
("noting that participation in all wells rather than relying upon on well stabilizes, prolongs,
and protects royalty owner's income").
38. 2 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS 433

(1991).
The very existence of hundreds, sometimes thousands, of different royalty and working
interest owners in some large fields discourages voluntary unitization. The costs of negotiating with so many different interests is high. Very often, some owners cannot be located at all. Title defects in the unit area must be cleared or litigated. All of this is
expensive.
Id.
39. STEPHEN L. MCDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 214 (1971).

40. Id. at 214-15.
41. John C. LaMaster, Project, Student Symposium on Oil and Gas: Consent Requirements in Compulsory Fieldwide Unitization, 46 LA. L. REV. 843, 846 (1986).
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tive agreement. To promote efficiency and equity, legal structures
must encourage cooperative action and discourage cheating.
All these problems obstructed voluntary pooling or unitization,
even if it could be negotiated under a veil of ignorance regarding a

party's relative ability or vulnerability to cheating. Existing common
law allocation systems even further complicated the task of reaching
agreements even further. Some rights owners have sites that are
structurally favorable for producing neighboring gas due to geological
good fortune. For some owners, "the reservoir contents tend to migrate toward their wells, giving them an opportunity to recover more
petroleum than was originally in place beneath the surface area of
their property."4 2 Those who benefited, even unfairly, from traditional rules have little incentive to rationalize the system economically. A leading treatise explains:
Tract owners with a natural structural advantage will want to retain the
value of this advantage in the unitization formula. Such owners are
unlikely to agree to a unitization agreement that does not give them at
least as much oil or gas as they would have received by "going it alone."
Even if the increase in ultimate recovery from unitization is so great
that these owners will receive more from unit operations under almost
any reasonable allocation formula than from individual development,
the owners have a much stronger bargaining position in the negotiations
than less-favored tract owners. They can hold out for the most
favorable allocation formula, secure in the knowledge that the regional
migration of oil will continue toward their tracts during any delay in
negotiations. If the others in the reservoir unitize without the participation of the owners of better-located tracts, the pressure maintenance
operations of the unit may well increase the amount of oil migration
toward the unsigned tracts. The holdouts then benefit from the unit
without incurring any costs of the pressure maintenance activity. This
disincentive
to43 unitize voluntarily
is
called
"profitable
obstructionism.

,

In addition to disincentives for cooperation resulting from the rule
of capture, other traditional common law principles also discouraged
pooling or unitization. The danger of tort liability means that a group
"that cannot secure unanimous voluntary agreement must place its

42.

STEPHEN L. MCDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION

IN THE UNITED STATES:

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 25 (1971).
43. 2 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS

431

(1991).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol23/iss4/6

16

Murray and Cross: The Case for a Texas Compulsory Unitization Statute.

1992]

TEXAS COMPULSORY UNITIZATION STA TUTE

1115

injection and producing wells in suboptimal positions and produce
them at suboptimal rates or else risk having to pay damages to the
injured estate."" Leases may "prohibit cross assignment, pooling of
production, or other acts necessary to effect a plan of unit opera'
tion."'45
Other disincentives are particular to Texas law, as explained
by Professor Weaver:
Texas courts have added certain other doctrines that make Texas' jurisprudence even more inimical to unitization and pooling. The worst offender in this regard is the rule that the owner of the right to lease (the
executive right) does not have the right to pool the owners of nonexecutive interests in the land. Because of this rule, the proponents of unitization must negotiate with a much larger number of owners in the
field. If some nonexecutive owners refuse to join the unit's risk of tort
liability increases, and the optimal placement of wells and transfer allowables is further hindered. The economics of drilling on
a tract with
46
effect.
to
difficult
unitization
makes
interest
an unsigned
Structures outside the common law create further disincentives to
unitization, such as that "created by state regulatory orders that favor
small-tract owners by granting liberal exceptions to the well-spacing
rules and by prorationing fields on the basis of formulas that allocate
production according to the number of wells drilled on each tract,
irrespective of the tract's acreage." 4 7 Psychological barriers also confound unitization, as individual owners may have some pride in control of their oil operation or mistrust of the parties needed for
cooperative extraction.4 8 Other problems may also arise from independent oil producers' distrust of the major oil companies,4 9 and
from the inertia created by established "customs, usages, rules, and
habits of thought."5 0
Even if an unusually cooperative group of neighbors can overcome

44. JACQUELINE

L.

WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS

254

(1986).
45. STEPHEN L. McDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES:

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 213 (1971).
46. 2 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS 432

(1991).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 432-33.
49. See WALLACE F. LOVEJOY & PAUL T. HOMAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF OIL CONSERVATION REGULATION 74.
50. Id. at 74-75. "Established rules and habits are unlikely to undergo substantial
changes unless subjected to internal stresses or external pressures." Id. at 264.
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all the above economic and psychological obstacles to voluntary unitization, effective unitization may still be frustrated. Constructing an
equitable unitization agreement may require "knowledge about the
reservoir and its environment that can be acquired only after substantial development." 5 1 Awaiting substantial development, however, can
undermine the ultimate benefits of unitized production and will inform individuals of their structural advantages, providing them a considerable economic incentive not to cooperate in a unitization
agreement.
The traditional common law rules of property rights in oil and gas
had the effect of discouraging cooperation. The resultant production
of oil and gas was necessarily economically inefficient. The allocation
of resources was also inequitable, insofar as it encouraged parties to
benefit from socially inefficient actions that obtained the oil underlying the land of others.
Unitization of oil fields can overcome the inefficiencies in traditional property rules for oil and gas production. Cooperative unit
production from a reservoir eliminates the perverse rush to drill, with
its attendant excessive costs and reduction in eventual recovery.52
Cooperative unitary operation has other efficiency benefits as well.
For example, coordinated development can enable the selection of the
best natural pressure drive,53 can permit the flexible adjustment of
production in response to market conditions,54 and can permit the use
of the optimum number and location of wells. 55 Unitization also can
enhance the process of discovering new oil:
[B]y holding out to explorers the prospect of being able to develop and
produce new discoveries on the most economical terms, it would en51. STEPHEN L. McDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 25 (1971).

52. Texas Mid-Continent Oil & Gas Association, Fieldwide Unitization: Vital to the Future of Texas [hereinafter Fieldwide Unitization] 11 (1973). "[Unit cooperation among producers further aids this objective by eliminating uneven withdrawal of oil or gas from the
reservoir and by tending to assure more reliable and successful pressure maintenance operations"). Id.
53. See STEPHEN L. McDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 202 (1971). McDonald explains: "in an oil reservoir in
which the dominant drive is dissolved gas expansion, the rate of production may deliberately
be reduced to allow a naturally subordinate (but more efficient) water drive to become dominant". Id.

54. See id. at 205.
55. Id.
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courage exploration and contribute to solving the problem, now referred to as the "energy crisis," of equating supplies of oil and gas with
growing demand in the years ahead.5 6
Most importantly, "unitization creates a consolidated private interest
that coincides with the public interest in efficient resource use, so that
the pursuit of private profit in petroleum extraction becomes an instrument of conservation. 5' 7 Unitization enables the powerful engine
58
of private interest to be harnessed for the overall public interest.
Notwithstanding the substantial efficiency and equity benefits of
unitization, state governments, including Texas, have been slow to
recognize the value of encouraging unitization. The inefficiencies of a
strict free market rule-of-capture regime have long been recognized,
and states have taken a variety of measures to ameliorate these inefficiencies. Most of the actions taken, however, are mere bandages upon
the symptoms of the problem, rather than cures such as unitization
provides. The following section describes the development and present state of state oil conservation regulation.

III.

DEVELOPMENT OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION STATUTES

As early as the 1910s, the state legislatures in major oil-producing
states recognized the wasteful anarchy produced by the traditional
common law rule of capture. These states created regulatory authority governing oil and gas production in order to conserve reserves.
State agencies were created to regulate oil production and ration output among competing property owners. Typical statutes regulated
the spacing between wells to prevent over-drilling, and a typical rule
56. Stephen L. McDonald, Unit Operationof Oil Reservoirs as an Instrument of Conservation, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 305, 312 (1973).

57. See

STEPHEN

L.

McDONALD,

PETROLEUM CONSERVATION

IN

THE UNITED

STATES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 201-02 (1971); see also John C. LaMaster, Consent Requirements in Compulsory Fieldwide Unitization, 46 LA. L. REV. 843 (1986) (summarizing the
rule of capture and noting). "[U]nitization creates a joint interest in developing the unit as
efficiently and economically as possible for maximum recovery"); Stephen L. McDonald, Unit

Operationof Oil Reservoirsas an Instrumentof Conservation, 49

NOTRE DAME LAW.

305, 311

(1973). Under unitization, the "pertinent costs to the individual operator, his fixed share of

the costs of the reservoir as a whole, no longer deviate from those of society; so the aim of
maximizing private profit now becomes consistent with maximizing benefit to society."). Id.
58. See Stephen L. McDonald, Unit Operationof Oil Reservoirs as an Instrument of Conservation, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 305, 312 (1973). Unitization "would harness the ingenuity,
enterprise, and energy of profit-motivated businessmen in the interest of society as a whole,
and would permit the flexible adjustment of current vs. future recovery under changing circumstances". Id.
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would permit no more than one oil well per forty acres. 9 In 1919, the
Texas Railroad Commission adopted its first well spacing rule,
prohibiting wells from being drilled less than three hundred feet
apart. 6° For some states, a major concern was reducing overall production in order to keep prices from dropping too low. In Texas, the
legislature adopted the Anti-Market Demand Prorationing Act in
1931.61 Among other provisions, this law dictated the spacing of
wells, to avoid overproduction, but Texas well spacing regulations
had many exceptions and often allowed more drilling than necessary
to drain a reservoir efficiently.62 Although the law also permitted the
Texas Railroad Commission to prorate production from wells, thus
enabling it to slow production and protect the rights of other parties,
judicial interpretation has limited the scope and efficacy of this authority.63 This law expressly rejected the concept of forced unitization
of oil fields. 64
While the mandatory spacing rules helped protect the goals of energy conservation, the benefits were imperfect. It would be the luckiest of coincidences if the mandatory spacing requirements happened
to produce optimum well locations for any given reservoir 65 or even to
produce the optimum amount of production. Efficient production depends on the unique conditions of each reservoir,66 and state spacing
59.

JACQUELINE

(1986).
60. 1 RAYMOND

L.

WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS

M.

MYERS, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION:

254

VOLUN-

§ 1.01 (2d ed. 1967).
61. For a summary of Texas oil well spacing regulations and their exceptions, see Robbert E. Hardwicke, Oil-Well Spacing Regulations and Protection of Property Rights in Texas,
31 TEX. L. REV. 99 (1952).
TARY-COMPULSORY

62. A summary of Texas Rule 37 and its exceptions is found in Robert E. Hardwicke,
Oil-Well Spacing Regulationsand Protection of Property Rights in Texas, 31 TEX. L. REV. 99,
101-05 (1952).
63. See Railroad Comm'n v. Woods Exploration and Producing Co., 405 S.W.2d 313
(Tex.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 991 (1966) (holding that commission's proration authority was
intended to limit production to marketplace demand when necessary but not to protect rights
of other rights owners). In any event, the Commission never showed any great inclination to
use its production control proration authority to modify the rule of capture.
64. For a good summary of this Act and its background, see JACQUELINE L. WEAVER,
UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS 38-60 (1986).
65. See STEPHEN L. MCDONALD, PETROLEUM
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 206 (1971).

CONSERVATION

IN THE UNITED

STATES:

66. See id. at 183. McDonald notes that "the optimum well density in a reservoir depends upon the unique conditions of that reservoir, notably its depth, recoverable reserves per
acre, drive, and other operating characteristics." Id.
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rules are both uniform and arbitrary. Indeed, an efficient production
level is highly unlikely because, with the exception of minimum spacing requirements, oil producers remain subject to the same overproduction pressures of the traditional rule of capture.6 7 Differential
spacing requirements among states may also distort exploration and
production efforts.6"
In addition to their limited effectiveness, the spacing rules created
potential inequity among rights holders. For example, if four landowners each own small ten acre tracts over a single oil reservoir, only
one of the four may be able to obtain drilling rights, and that lucky
landowner would be able to drain away the oil underlying the other
three, while they would be legally precluded from drilling.6 9 Such an
outcome would inevitably produce enormous costs from rent-seeking
behavior as each landowner lobbied to be the one authorized to drill.
Any government assignment of such a right would unavoidably appear arbitrary and violate fundamental concept of equity. This obvious problem led to the development of pooling. 0
Courts soon recognized that individual landowners should not have
a right to develop their portion of a common reservoir of oil or gas
without regard for the rights of the other owners of the common supply but should be subject to the state's interest in conserving resources

67. See id. at 198:
[L]egislatures and commissions devise a host of detailed rules which, to be administratively feasible, must have broad applicability throughout a given state and must at least
partly disregard the infinite variation of conditions from one reservoir to another. Consequently, the rules may fail to require the optimum well density or rate of extraction or
degree of ultimate recovery in any reservoir. Rules designed to cover special cases, to
bolster weak economic interests, to protect correlative rights indirectly, or to offset disincentives created by other rules add not only to the complexity and cost of administration
but also to the potential for inefficient resource use.

Id.
68. See id. at 187.

69.
(1985).

JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS

21

70. Bruce M. Kramer, Compulsory Poolingand Unitization: State Options in Dealing with
Uncooperative Owners, 7 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 255, 258 (1986).

The concepts of well spacing and pooling go hand in hand. Without well spacing regulation, if only one well were to be drilled on a forty acre tract in which multiple interests

existed, disputes would certainly arise as to which mineral owner or mineral lessee would
be entitled to that single well. If the well spacing provisions were fixed, the economic
necessities of the circumstances would force the owners of the mineral or working interests to reach a private accomodation in order to drill their one well.
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and protecting the just distribution of these resources.7 1 The United
States Supreme Court eventually reached the issue in Burford v. Sun
Oil Company.72 The Supreme Court explained:
Oil exists in the pores and crevices of rock and sand and moves through
these channels .... The chief forces causing oil to move are gas and
water, and it is essential that the pressures be maintained.... As the gas
pressure is dissipated, it becomes necessary to put the well "on the
pump" at great expense; and the sooner the gas from a field is exhausted, the more oil is irretrievably lost. Since the oil moves through
the entire field, one operator can not only draw the oil from under his
own surface area, but can also, if he is advantageously located, drain oil
from the most distant parts of the reservoir. For these, and many other
reasons based on geologic realities, each oil and gas field must be regulated as a unit for conservation purposes.73
In 1927, the city of Oxford, Kansas, passed the nation's first compulsory pooling statute for oil and gas, in company with well spacing
regulations. The Oxford ordinance prohibited the drilling of more
than one well per city block. 74 While granting only one drilling permit per block, Oxford required that the permit grantee must share the
royalties from recovered oil with all other owners on the block, prorated by their square footage of ownership. 75 Other non-drilling owners who sought to participate in royalties were required to bear a
comparable proportion of the costs of drilling and operating the
well. 76 The Oxford ordinance was challenged on constitutional
grounds but was sustained by the federal courts.7 7
Following Oxford, most oil-producing states adopted well spacing
regulations along with some form of mandatory pooling authority to
allocate costs and proceeds of drilling. Texas, however, originally
adopted well spacing requirements without mandatory pooling
authority.
71. See R. M. Williams, Compulsory Pooling and Unitization (of Oil and Gas Rights), 15
INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 223, 232-35 (1964) (summarizing early oil and gas

litigation.)
72. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).

73. Id. at 318-19.
74. See R. M. Williams, Compulsory Pooling and Unitization (of Oil and Gas Rights), 15
INST. ON OIL & GAS L. TAX'N 223, 240-41 (1964).

75. Id. at 241.
76. Id.
77. See Marrs v. City of Oxford, 24 F.2d 541 (D. Kan. 1928), aff'd 32 F.2d 134 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 573 (1929).
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The 1931 act in Texas gave the Texas Railroad Commission some
additional powers to prevent the waste of oil and gas. These powers
were insufficient, however, as illustrated by the then newly-discovered
east Texas field.78 While the commission had the authority to prorate
total oil production, it was not required to do so based upon production efficiency. The railroad commission could, and did, allocate
more production to those conducting excessive drilling in east Texas
and less to potentially more efficient wells in other parts of the state.7 9
The Anti-Market Demand Prorationing Act was aimed at raising oil
prices more than at reducing economic waste associated with inefficient production. The Texas legislature passed additional legislation
in 1932 and 1933, but these laws were focused upon helping independent producers against the major oil companies and, if anything,
yielded greater inefficiency. 0 During this time period, a few localities
passed compulsory pooling ordinances for production within the municipality's boundaries.8
Rather than opting for forced unitization of reservoirs, which some
oilmen considered too socialistic, the government imposed a production control system that offered some promise of higher oil prices.
However, not only did this system fail to correct the inefficiencies of
the rule of capture, it introduced new inefficiencies into the system,
particularly by reducing incentives for exploration. The system
capped allowable production without fully accounting for the costs of
new exploration. In so doing, it created an incentive to maximize production from known fields, which are relatively less expensive, and a
disincentive to do the deep exploratory drilling that was necessary to
78.

JACQUELINE

L.

WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS

39

(1986).
The discovery of this gigantic field on October 9, 1930, by an independent wildcatter
named Dad Joiner, set off a frenzied drilling spree so that a year later more than 3,000
wells had been completed in the field. The result was a glut of oil on the market and a
sharp decline in its price. By May 1, 1931, East Texas was producing more than 1 million

barrels of oil per day, one-third of U.S. production, at a price of 10 cents per barrel versus
its 1930 price of about $1.00 per barrel. On this date the commission's first proration
order for the East Texas field was implemented, but it had no effect on the depressed price
of crude oil.

Id.
79. See id. at 45.

80. See id. at 60-68.
81. See Scott Lansdown, Municipal Ordinances that Compel or Encourage the Pooling or
Unitization of Oil and Gas Interests, in 14 OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LAW, STATE BAR SECTION REPORT, 2-3 (1989).
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find undiscovered reservoirs. An economic analysis found that
"[1]ong-run investment behavior of the domestic oil industry has been
markedly distorted by market demand prorationing." 2 Eventually,
Texas recognized the limitations of a pure regulatory system of production controls and enabled unitary operation of some reservoirs.
The Texas legislature initially authorized voluntary unitization
agreements in gas fields under the 1935 Gas Conservation Act. This
law was passed in response to the perceived needs of the large panhandle gas field, and the statute was carefully limited. 3 Indeed, the law
did not even authorize the unitization of oil fields in Texas.
The first meaningful provision for oil field unitization in Texas occurred in 1949 with the passage of the Voluntary Unitization Act. 84
The primary purpose of this law was to provide immunity from antitrust laws for voluntary unitization agreements.85 However, the 1949
Act did relatively little to encourage unitization. For example, the
law authorized units only for secondary recovery and gas conservation using some reinjection processes and "clearly [did] not authorize
voluntary agreements for exploratory drilling or related exploratory
activities, ' ' 86 even though unitization had successfully been used on
both private and public lands for exploratory purposes. Professors
Smith and Weaver illustrate the potential significance of this limitation of unitization to secondary recovery operations:
Consider the effect of section 101.01 1's limitations on operators of an oil
82. Edward W. Erickson, Crude Oil Prices, Drilling Incentives and the Supply of New
Discoveries, 10 NAT. RES. J. 27, 39 (1970). Erickson elaborated:
Drilling costs increase exponentially with depth, while allowables do not. Therefore, allowables discourage the exploration of deep horizons. Another way to offset the expense
of probing deep formations is to complete several known shallower formations out of the
same well that goes on to test a deep formation. To the extent that regulatory agencies
have discouraged multiple completions, they have inhibited exploration and caused operators to choose less desirable prospects than they would have in the absence of regulatory
constraint.
Id.
83. See JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS 6874 (1986) (noting that the law was responsive to special needs of independent oil producers in

panhandle field). The 1935 legislation "did not deflect significantly from Texas' anti-unitization policy." Id.
84. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 101.001-101.052 (Vernon 1978) [Voluntary Unitization Act, 51st Leg., R.S., ch. 259 1949 Tex. Gen. Laws 477-83].
85. See 2 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS
§ 11. 1(c) (1990).
86. Id. at § ll.2(A)(1).
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field with a gas-cap drive in a reservoir so shaped that the gas-cap owners have little or no ownership interest in the connected oil zone. Primary production can proceed without unitization under existing
conservation statutes as follows: the operators overlying the gas cap
may drill wells into the cap and produce that amount of gas [permitted
under conservation statutes] .... The oil operators may produce their
oil within the allowed gas-oil ratios and prorationing schedules. Eventually the gas cap will expand downward, and the oil wells will produce
the migrated gas. In this situation, the correlative rights of the gas-cap
producers and royalty interest owners are not well protected, nor is the
greatest production of oil achieved, because this would require absolutely no production of gas from gas-cap wells. Under these facts, the
operators in this field may desire to enter into a unitization agreement
whereby the gas-cap owners agree to shut in their wells, or better yet,
simply not to drill them, and the oil well owners agree that any gas
eventually produced from their oil wells will be allocated to the gas-cap
owners. All parties benefit: maximum gas-cap pressure is conserved for
oil production, and gas-cap owners do not risk losing their gas to the oil
well operators. The unitization agreement is clearly in the public interest of (1) increasing ultimate recovery, (2) reducing drilling costs, and
(3) protecting correlative rights. Yet it is extremely doubtful that the
Railroad Commission has the authority to approve such an agreement.
No injection wells for any sort of cycling or repressuring are contemplated in the agreement. This is not a "secondary recovery" operation
under section 101.011's nomenclature, even though it is necessary to
increase the ultimate recovery of oil.87
The 1949 act authorizes unitization only for certain types of repressuring secondary recovery operations and does not authorize unitization for more advanced techniques, such as in situ combustion or
miscible displacement tertiary recovery techniques.88 Nor does the
law provide for unitized agreements for processing or marketing, even
though the "substantial cost saving [of joint marketing and processing
operations] allows operators to continue to produce the field for a

87. Id. at § 11.2(A)(3).
88. Id. at § 11.2(A)(4). The Texas Railroad Commission, however, has interpreted the
statutory language to permit unitization for at least some tertiary recovery operations. Id. at
§ 11.2(B)(2). The statutory language has compelled the commission to insist that any enhanced recovery operation include at least one injection well, however. As a consequence, one
producer was required to construct an unnecessary injection well that "would simply increase
the cost of the project by many thousands of dollars without any offsetting gain in the amount
of oil recovered," in order to obtain Commission approval for a unitization project in the early
1980s. Id.
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longer period of time, thereby recovering condensate that otherwise
would have been abandoned as uneconomic."' 9 The law also required
a long series of findings by the railroad commission prior to authorizing a proposed unitization, which made clear a legislative intent "to
ensure that unitization agreements are allowed only as a last resort." 9°
Moreover, the Texas voluntary unitization law contains a number of
limitations on the nature of unitization agreements that "deny to operators in a unitized reservoir the benefits . . . with respect to the
optimum rate of production and cooperative marketing,. . . and pos-

sibly also those with respect to well spacing, gas-oil ratios, and gas
flaring." 91 Since 1949, the act has not been expanded and has seen
rather sparing use. Indeed, some have concluded that the law's complications outweigh its protections and have proceeded with voluntary
unitization agreements outside the 1949 act's procedures.92
Some of the shortcomings of the Texas voluntary unitization statute are illustrated by the substantial Fairway field discovered in east
Texas. Rights owners for this reservoir evinced particular cooperation in seeking approval of voluntary unitization starting shortly after
the field's discovery.93 Yet difficulties in negotiating an allocation

formula stalled the unitization for five years.94 This belated agreement was achieved only after the railroad commission fearing a decline in reservoir pressure drastically reduced allowable withdrawals
95
from the field to push the parties into a unitization agreement.
Professors Lovejoy and Homan note that while the Fairway field is
often "touted as a classic example of good conservation techniques,"
89.
(1986).

JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS 85

90. 2 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS

§ 11.4(A)(1) (1991). Smith and Weaver also note that the many findings required by the act
"are a breeding ground for controversy, contested hearings, lengthy delays in securing approval, and litigation." Id. at § 11.4(B)(1). In practice, however, the railroad commission has
not faced difficulty in promptly approving most unitization requests. Id.
91. STEPHEN L. McDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 213 (1971).

92. Scott Lansdown, Municipal Ordinances that Compel or Encourage the Pooling or Unitization of Oil and Gas Interest, in 14 OIL, GAS AND MINERAL LAW, STATE BAR SECTION
REPORT 3 (1989).
93. See WALLACE F. LovEjoY & PAUL T. HOMAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF OIL CONSERVATION REGULATION 81-82 (1967) (citing DALLAS MORNING NEWS on October 20,
1963).
94. Id. at 82.
95. Id.
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it actually "came painfully close to becoming a classic example of the
physical and economic waste that can result when an effort at good
field development and production practices is crippled by inadequate
conservation statutes and regulations." 96 Even when voluntary unitization agreements can be negotiated, the negotiations typically require nearly six years. 9
During the next two decades, several states recognized the deficiencies of voluntary unitization and passed some form of compulsory
unitization law, but Texas rejected all attempts to adopt such legislation to force unitization. In 1965, Texas adopted a compulsory pooling statute in the Mineral Interest Pooling Act (MIPA) to require
cooperative development of small areas. 98 This law permits parties to
appeal to the railroad commission to compel pooling of oil or gas
among several small tracts. While pooling provides some of the benefits of unitization, it is generally inferior, because "[u]nitization for
secondary recovery purposes generally results in greater ultimate recovery of oil and gas and longer-lived fields, thus providing additional
employment and drilling opportunities, especially in water-flooding
operations that use closely spaced injection wells." 99 Pooling covers a

much smaller area than unitization (usually only a small part of a
reservoir) and therefore offers only a fraction of unitization's efficiency benefits.
In addition to the inherent limitations of pooling, the Texas law has
specific shortcomings. MIPA was limited in its scope. The application of MIPA is limited to two or more separately owned tracts,
where the reservoir is sufficiently identified that the commission can
determine size and shape of proration units, thus excluding exploratory drilling from the pooling act."° The law also limits compulsory
pooling applications to no more than 160 acres for an oil well or 640
acres for a gas well, thereby precluding the unitization of most reservoirs. Also, state lands cannot be compulsorily pooled in Texas. The
administrative requirements of mandatory pooling laws further dis-

96. Id. at 82-83.
97. See JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS 318
(1986) (summarizing results of Texas A&M University study of unitization of seven oil fields).
98. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 102.001-.112 (Vernon 1978).
99. JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS 124-25
(1986).
100. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 102.011 (Vernon 1978).
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courage their use." 1
MIPA also requires that no compulsory pooling order may issue
unless the applicant for the order has made a strong effort to obtain a
voluntary pooling arrangement and failed. The applicant must show
the commission that it has made a "fair and reasonable offer" and
been rebuffed. As a consequence, "most pooling in Texas occurs voluntarily, without resort to governmental process." 10 2 MIPA has been
deemed ineffective except as an agency giving approval to agreements
voluntary entered into. 103 Nor have pooling efforts fared particularly
well at the railroad commission or in the courts. One study found
that thirty-six percent of applications to the commission were either
dismissed or cancelled, usually over the fair and reasonable offer requirement." ° Of the remaining applications, twenty-four percent
were denied. 105 Of thoce Commission decisions appealed to courts,
denials have fared better than approvals." 6 While MIPA has been
amended to liberalize mandatory pooling somewhat, the "Railroad
Commission's own guide to MIPA warns that the act is not a 'cureall' because it is so limited in scope and effect." 10 7 Wyoming's Commissioner of Public Lands has declared that Texas has mandatory
pooling only "in form," and that MIPA is not reasonably effective in
10 8
practice.
The state statute has provided some cooperative actions though,

101. See, e.g., Oscar E. Swan & Joseph E. Hallock, The Comparisons, Contrasts, and
Effects of Compulsory Pooling Statutes, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 911, 915 (1983):
most state statutes and procedures, whether by accident or design, have sufficient inherent
uncertainty of result so that they should be viewed as the last resort, not the first. We see
too many cases where the first step an "owner" takes is to file a forced pooling applica-

tion. Then he talks to his partners, sometimes. Other times, he waits to conduct his
negotiations until the hearing is in progress. This is going at it completely bass-akwards.

Id.
102. 2 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS
§ 12.1(B) (1991).
103. See generally JAQUELINE L. WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN
TEXAS, 131-36 (1986).
104. Id.; 3 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS

§ 12.1(B) (1991).
105. 3 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GASS

§ 12.1(B) (1991).
106. Id. § 12.1 at 8. (noting that courts have upheld all three denials appealed but only
upheld about half of approvals appealed)
107. 3 ERNEST E. SMITH & JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL AND GAS
§ 12.1 at 9 (1990).
108. Id. § 12.1 at 920.
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particularly under its pooling authority. Moreover, the railroad commission and the courts have tacitly recognized the benefits of unitization and have generally sought to employ their powers in a manner to
encourage pooling and unitization. 19 However, absent a compulsory
unitization statute, the system will fail to provide the necessary unitization of most fields. One commentator summarized:
Most states, however, have found that a completely voluntary system
was not adequate. Units were not being formed, an excessive amount of
time was required, or only portions of a field could be unitized so that

projects could not be done efficiently. Problems in forming voluntary
units were caused from factors such as too many parties involved, a
small minority was blocking action, disagreement on participation in
the unit, a lack of understanding of technology, et cetera. 110

Railroad commission efforts to pressure parties into unitization are a
poor substitute for a structured, compulsory unitization statute. The
railroad commission's manipulation of "production control is a cumbersome and inefficient solution to this type of problem, and one
which gives short shrift to protection of property interests, since production penalties are imposed on everyone, regardless of willingness
to cooperate."I'
While Texas has slowly adopted conservation measures to mitigate
the inefficiencies of the rule of capture, these statutes and regulations
are plainly insufficient and fail to address the root causes of the inefficiency. In addition, the structure of prevailing pooling and unitization in Texas has created additional sources of inefficiency and
inequity in oil and gas production, as described in the following
section.
IV.

PROBLEMS IN POOLING AND UNITIZATION

The Texas oil conservation statutes, including mandatory pooling
and voluntary unitization, did not displace the fundamental rule of
capture but instead imposed a new regulatory structure on top of the
common law rules. As a consequence, inefficiencies of the rule of cap109. See, e.g., JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN

TEXAS 315 (1986).
110. Granville Dutton, A Summary on Unitization in Various States, THE LANDMAN,
June 1985, at 45.
111. WALLACE F. LovEJoY & PAUL T. HOMAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF OIL CONSERVATION REGULATION 82 (1967).
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ture remain, to a degree, and the new regulatory structure has created
additional sources of inequity and inefficiency. This section considers
difficulties resulting from non-consenting owners in pooling arrangements, from the effect of pooling agreements on pre-existing leases,
from modem technological developments in oil production that further complicate the efficiencies of production, and from deficiencies in
the regulatory process itself.
A.

Non-Consenting Owners

Any cooperative production arrangement, such as unitization or
pooling, must confront the problem of the non-consenting owner who
refuses voluntarily to acquiesce to the rules of the group. As a practical matter, a similar problem arises even under mandatory authorization for unitization or pooling. Indeed, compulsory pooling statutes
can introduce new sources of inefficiency. Considerable time is required for government approval of compulsory pooling. During this
time, other rights owners may wish to proceed with drilling and production. The structure permits the non-consenting owner to do nothing and await the results from the others' production before choosing
to join the pool, depending on the results of drilling. The other owners can be forced to carry the non-consenting owner, and he will not
have to put up his share of production costs. If the risky exploration
activity proves successful, the non-consenting owner can then insist
upon being pooled with the other owners and receive the benefits of
oil production. The non-consenting owner can thereby obtain the
benefits without assuming any of the risks of initial production efforts.' 2 This is so because the law permits an owner to reject an offer
to pool costs prior to exploratory drilling and then to obtain a compulsory pooling order, if the drilling is successful." 3I
The non-consenting owner can thus escape the costs and risks of
unsuccessful drilling-always a great possibility in the oil and gas
business. The risk of failure is substantial, as "of every 100 exploratory wells drilled in search of new fields, less than two find enough
112. See Bruce M. Kramer, Compulsory Pooling and Unitization: State Options in Dealing with Uncooperative Owners, 7 J. ENERGY L. & POLiCY 255, 266 (1986) (describing the
nature of these risks. These risks include the possibility of drilling a dry hole and the risk of
"encountering unexpected mechanical or geological problems which greatly increase the actual
cost of drilling"). Id.
113. See Granville Dutton, A Summary on Unitization in VariousStates, THE
June 1985, at 45.
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petroleum to be commercially successful.""' 4 If the well is not productive, the producing operator has no means of recouping its drilling
costs from the uncooperative non-consenting owner.II 5 This system
provides a clear incentive for some rights owners not to consent to
voluntary pooling. The system may also provide a disincentive for
production among other rights owners. As one commentator
explained:
It would not be in the best interest of the working interest owner to buy
into an operating agreement and face the dual burden of providing upfront capital for the drilling and also the risk of losing his entire investment in the event of a dry hole ....

The potential operator will be

discouraged from drilling if he knows that he has to carry the full risk
of a dry hole and, in addition, share the benefits from a profitable well
with those [who] bore none of the usual risk of drilling." 6

The problem can be demonstrated symbolically. If a single owner
were to consider drilling for oil, he or she would base that decision on
an analysis of the benefits potentially obtainable versus the costs of
drilling, considering the probability of achieving the benefits. In this
illustration, B represents the potential benefits from oil production, C
represents the costs of production, and P represents the probability
that the exploratory efforts will succeed in finding oil and achieving B.
The owner would go forward with exploration if PB > PC + (1-P)C.
This same standard would apply for two equal, cooperative rights
owners, where each would use a standard of P(.5B) > P(.5C) + (1P)(.5C). Consider what happens when one owner refuses to consent,
however, and forces the other to go it alone in exploration and production. The non-consenting owner knows that mandatory pooling
statutes will compel the first operator to share the benefits of an oil
strike. With some simplification, the operator now must bear all the
costs in the first instance, while it will still be required to share the
benefits. This operator will go forward only where P(.5B) > P(.5C)
+ (1-P)C. The addition of (1-P)(.5C) to the cost side of the equation
is sure to deter some operators from exploratory drilling when an efficient allocation of costs would dictate drilling. Consequently, the law
would have the perverse effect of discouraging efficient risk-taking be114. Robert L. Mellen III, Note, Compulsory Unitization in Florida: A New Emphasis in
the Energy Crisis, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 198 (1974).
115. Id. at 262.
116. Id. at 264.
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havior in oil exploration. Moreover, the law will particularly discourage particularly costly new forms of oil exploration, such as
horizontal drilling,117 even though these new methods may yield
greater benefits.
Some states have "free ride" pooling statutes that permit non-consenting owners to escape the risk entirely, just as described above,
without bearing further costs or losing any share of successful production.1 18 Most states, including Texas, have sought to address the
problem by using some form of "risk penalty" statute to penalize nonconsenting owners seeking a free ride." 9 This risk penalty involves
some amount of money charged to non-consenting owners (or deducted from their recovery) to compensate for the risk that others in
the pool took in the exploratory drilling. Some states provide specific
non-discretionary risk penalties that must be borne by non-consenting
owners, 20 but Texas gives the railroad commission the authority and
responsibility to establish the most appropriate risk penalty, so long as
it does not exceed one hundred percent of the drilling and completion
costs.121 The commission must impose some risk penalty on all non22
consenting parties. 1
Although the assessment of an accurate risk penalty can avert the
inequity and incentive not to cooperate described above, current
Texas law often does not yield the proper risk penalty. Indeed, it
appears that Texas law provides risk penalties that tend to be too low,
thereby producing a somewhat milder version of the inefficient scenario described above, where a non-consenting owner may take a free
ride on the risk-taking of others. The "one hundred percent of costs"
ceiling created by Texas law will be too low to fully reflect the appropriate risk penalty for especially risky operations. Given the extremely low probability of finding commercially profitable new oil
117. See discussion infra at pt. IV.C.1.
118. Eleven states have such free-ride statutes. See ALA. CODE § 9-17-13 (1980);
ALASKA STAT. § 31.05.100(c) (1979); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-505(A) (1976); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 377.27 (West 1974); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-4-7-14 (Burns 1981); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 84.8(2) (West 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 259.110 (Vernon Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 82-11-202(2) (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. § 522.060(3) (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113393 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-08 (Supp. 1985).
119. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 102.052 (Vernon 1978).
120. See Bruce M. Kramer, Compulsory Pooling and Unitization: State Options in Dealing with Uncooperative Owners, 7 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 255, 264-65 (1986).
121. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 102.052(a) (Vernon 1978).
122. Id.
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fields, 123 the penalty should be far greater than a mere doubling of
out-of-pocket costs, as other states' statutes have recognized. Four
states automatically provide for a two hundred percent risk penalty,
and two other states provide for presumptive penalties of up to one
hundred, fifty percent.124 Even these high levels are "less severe than
the penalties knowledgeable operators agree to voluntarily for similar
25
ventures."1
Individual cases also demonstrate the inadequacy of risk penalties
allowed by Texas law. For example, a New Mexico order, upheld by
the courts of that state, found that a two hundred percent risk penalty
was most appropriate in one case 26 and an Oklahoma court affirmed
a two hundred, fifty percent risk penalty in another.127 In another
case from South Dakota, the operator sought a two hundred, fifty
percent risk penalty, and the non-consenting party itself agreed in private negotiations that a one hundred, fifty percent risk penalty would
be reasonable.' 2 This case also described another reservoir where
voluntary negotiations between the parties resulted in agreement on a
two hundred, fifty percent risk penalty for the non-consentor 29 Testimony presented to one court indicated that the "risk compensation
used in voluntary pooling agreements has ranged from 50% to
300%.""13 ° The Texas Railroad Commission has no authority to impose such high penalties, even though they may be warranted. A recent seminar concluded that the "100% statutory maximum risk
penalty no longer reflects the customary non-consent penalties found
in [voluntarily negotiated] operating agreements currently in use."' 31
If the risk penalty is too small, efficient production will not occur. At

123. See Robert L. Mellen III, Note, Compulsory Unitization in Florida: A New Emphasis
in the Energy Crisis?, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 196, 198 (1974).
124. Oscar E. Swan & Joseph E. Hallock, The Comparisons. Contrasts, and Effects of
Compulsory Pooling Statutes, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 911, 940 (1983). Colorado, Nebraska, New Mexico and Wyoming provide for 200% risk penalty, Illinois provides for 150%
penalty, and Utah provides for 120% or 150% penalty, depending upon whether field is
proven. Id.
125. Id. at 941.
126. Viking Petroleum, Inc. v. Oil Conservation Comm'n, 672 P.2d 280, 284 (N.M.

1983).
127. Holmes v. Corporation Comm'n, 466 P.2d 630, 633 (Okla. 1970).
128. See Application of Kohlman, 263 N.W.2d 674, 678-79 (S.D. 1978) (conservation
commission chose to apply only 100% risk penalty).
129. Id. at 677.
130. Application of Kohlman, 263 N.W.2d 674, 678 (S.D. 1978).
131. See Frank Douglass and H. Philip Whitworth, Jr. Mineral Interest Pooling Act and
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least one decision found that "due to the estimated time required to
recover the costs of drilling, completing and operating the well, the
venture would be economically unfeasible if the bonus-penalty were
'
not set at an amount larger than 150%. 132
In addition, when assessing the amount of a fair risk penalty within
the one hundred percent ceiling, the railroad commission has not fully
considered the costs that a non-consenting owner should bear. Costs
considered in a risk penalty include the drilling and completion costs
of unit wells but do not include the costs of lease acquisition, regulatory expense, or dry holes. 133 These costs must be solely borne by the
initial producer. Such costs provide a further incentive to refuse to
pool voluntarily and to wait until a profitable well is assured. Not
only does the non-cooperative party avoid risk, it also avoids all legal
costs of pooling. In short, the statutory provision for a risk penalty
ameliorates the bias for non-consenting owners but remains insufficient to correct the problem.
B.

Excluded Acreage

The superimposition of pooling authority atop existing free market
arrangements has created another source of inequity and possible inefficiency. This situation is generally known as the "excluded acreage"
problem and arises out of the following circumstances. Suppose that
a landowner leases his entire tract of, say, three hundred acres to an
operator to produce oil or gas and to pay the landowner a royalty.
The duration of such leases is typically from one to five years. 134 The
operator then joins part of the tract into a pool, which contains producing wells on other property. This part may be a relatively small
portion of the land, say, thirty acres. The operator never drills for oil
on the landowner's tract during the duration of the lease.
Given the above circumstances, one might expect the landowner to
refuse to renew the lease and seek another operator who would do
more to find oil. Typical leases, however, contain something known
Forced Pooling 64 (May 14-15, 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the St. Mary's
Law Journal).
132. Holmes, 466 P.2d at 633.
133. See Frank Douglass and H. Philip Whitworth, Jr. Mineral Interest Pooling Act and
Forced Pooling 64 (May 14-15, 1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the St. Mary's
Law Journal).
134. Allen L. Handlan & Kevin L. Sykes, Pooling and Unitization: Legal and Ethical
Considerations, 19 TULSA L.J. 309, 323 n.66 (1984).
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as a habendum clause. 35 The habendum clause automatically extends the operator's lease, so long as the operator has drilled for oil on
the landowner's property. In our above example, the operator had
not expended resources to find oil on the landowner's property, but
the operator did join a fragment of the property to a pool that was
producing some oil or gas. Most courts have held that the pooling of
a portion of the landowner's tract is sufficient to extend the lease in-

definitely under the habendum clause.1 36 Texas law apparently follows this majority rule.1 37 This allows the operator lessee to hold
large tracts of land beyond the primary lease term, without drilling or
paying royalties on that portion to the landowner. The excluded acre-

age (that owned by the landowner but outside the pool) is unproduc-

tive and, more significantly, beyond the reach of other potential
lessees who may want to develop the acreage. The landowner's only
recourse is to sue for a breach of the lease's implied covenant of reasonable development, but such an action is expensive and presents
38

"almost insurmountable" problems of proof for the landowner.
Some knowledgeable landowners have modified lease terms to at-

tempt to free the excluded acreage, through a provision commonly
known as a Pugh clause.1 39

Although the language of the Pugh

clause is typically straightforward, some courts have refused to give
effect to the clause, finding it to be contradictory to the state compul-

sory pooling statute. 14° Other courts have employed technical inter135. See, e.g., Paul A. Morris, Note, Productionfrom Compulsory Pooled Unit Extends
Lease on Outside Acreage?, 33 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. REV. 184, 184 (1961); John R. Rebman,
Comment, Continuation of the Oil and Gas Lease on Outside Acreage by Production Within the
Unit, 35 TEX. L. REV. 833, 834 (1957). The operator-lessee generally supplies the landowner
with a form lease agreement, usually one known as the "Producer's 88 Lease." R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 6.2 (1983).
136. See Jones v. Bronco Oil & Gas Co., 446 So. 2d 611 (Ala. 1984); Delatte v. Woods, 94
So. 2d 281 (La. 1957); Gray v, Cameron, 234 S.W.2d 769 (Ark. 1950); Clovis v. Pacific Northwest Pipeline Co., 345 P.2d 729 (Colo. 1959); Somers v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 566 P.2d
775 (Kan. 1977).
137. See Buchanan v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 218 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1955) (applying
Texas law).
138. See, Paul A. Morris, Comment, Production from Compulsorily Pooled Unit, 33
ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 184, 192 (1961). For example, such an action requires "the use of
expert opinion on subsurface conditions, adequacy of the lessee's development program as
compared with other operators, cost of additoinal wells and what they would produce and
numerous other items all of highly nebulous character." Id.
139. See Shown v. Getty Oil Co., 645 S.W. 2d 555, 560 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1982).
140. See Allen L. Handlan & Kevin L. Sykes, Pooling and Unitization: Legal and Ethical

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

35

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 23 [2022], No. 4, Art. 6

1134

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 23:1099

pretive principles to avoid giving effect to a Pugh clause.141
The current state of the law is inequitable to landowners.142 The
landowner did agree to the habendum clause, of course, and arguably
should be bound by this arms-length transaction. Rigorous reliance
on freedom of contract in this circumstance, however, would be misguided given the inequality of bargaining power in the lease transaction. Most landowners, many of which are agricultural producers,
are unfamiliar with the oil industry and are often not represented by
counsel. 143 These landowners are unaware of the implications of the
habendum clause, especially since the lease language "is often not so
clear that [even] a reasonably prudent landowner could be expected to
understand the effect of [the] clause."'44 The unfairness was acknowledged in a Mississippi decision that departed from the majority rule
on excluded acreage:
Our conservation laws were enacted to be fair and reasonable and to do
justice and equity to all parties concerned, and we think that it was not
contemplated under the statutes authorizing the establishment of drilling units and the compulsory pooling resulting therefrom that the establishment of the unit and the production from a well on land therein
other than
the leased land should affect the leased land without the
45
unit.1

Also, the Oklahoma legislature recognizing
this inequity created
146
something of a statutory Pugh clause.
In addition to the inequity of the majority rule on the excluded
acreage problem, this rule also yields inefficiency and underproduction. A lease-holding operator can retain rights on future oil in virtual perpetuity, without trying to find the oil. One could defend this
situation by suggesting that the operator has no incentive not to drill
for oil, if circumstances were promising for finding valuable resources.

Considerations, 19 TULSA L. J. 328-29 (1984); Bibler Bros. Timber Corp. v. Tojac Minerals,
Inc., 664 S.W.2d 472, 474 (Ark. 1984) (finding Pugh Clause inoperative where Commissioner
of Conservation has established a compulsary unit).
141. See Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Scheib, 726 F.2d 614, 616 (10th Cir. 1984) (noting that
Pugh clause was contrary to previous applications of habendum clause in compulsory pooling
and that such clause must be particularly explicit) See generally, Mathis v. Texas Int'l Petroleum Corp., 627 F. Supp. 759 (W.D. Tex. 1986).
142. See, e.g., 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 721 (1989).

143. R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS, § 6.2.
144. 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW, § 722.
145. Texas Gulf Prod. Co. v. Griffith, 65 So. 2d 447, 452 (Miss. 1953).
146. OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 87.1(b) (West 1991).
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The operator, after all, would profit from such exploratory activities.
The efficiency problem arises because the excluded acreage rules serve
to lock up this acreage in the hands of a given operator. Any single
operator may fail to drill for oil, even when it would be efficient and
profitable to do so. A particular operator may, for example, be unusually risk averse. Alternatively, the operator may have a capital
shortage that prevents drilling, which it someday hopes to remedy.
An operator might even use the control as leverage in other dealings
with the landowner. There are doubtless other explanations as well.
Efficiency dictates that the excluded acreage be opened up for a free
market transaction, to be bid upon by the current operator as well as
1 47
any others who feel the tract is promising.
As societal welfare suffers from the inefficiency, potentially valuable
oil resources are not found and exploited. The excluded acreage rules
hinder the development of new energy resources that may be crucial
to national energy sufficiency. 4 8 The excluded acreage is by its very
nature proximate to an existing field and therefore a probable candidate for successful exploration yet remains unexplored.
C. Modern Technological Developments
As the technology of oil production advances, unitization of reservoirs becomes even more important. Various developing technologies
promise to extract additional oil from previously depleted fields and
can produce this oil efficiently. Lack of unitization impairs implementation of these advanced technologies, because free riding rights
owners can seize the oil recovery benefits from producers who
adopted the advances. Because these new developments tend to be
relatively costly, the free rider problem can be especially pronounced.
Only unitization can cure the underlying deterrent to employing new
recovery technologies. This section discusses two such categories of
new technology: the growing use of horizontal drilling technology
and advanced recovery methods.

147. The market can thus check for the efficiency of drilling. If the excluded acreage is
indeed not promising, no other operators will seek the lease, and the pre-existing operator
presumably will continue its lease. If some other operators consider the acreage promising,
however, they should be given the opportunity to invest.
148. See William G. Somerville III, Comment, Pooling and the Excluded Acreage Situation: Toward a More EquitableRule, 37 ALA. L. REV. 119, 136-38 (1985).
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1. Horizontal Drilling
The development and certain growth of horizontal drilling technology complicates traditional methods of production allocation, including voluntary unitization and pooling structures. Yet, this new
drilling technique offers great benefits for enhanced production of oil
and natural gas. Existing legal structures are ill-suited, however, for
apportioning production from horizontal wells.
The term horizontal drilling is quite descriptive. The traditional
well used to find or produce oil and gas consisted of a drill penetrating
the earth in a straight line that was at least roughly perpendicular to
the land's surface. Horizontal drilling differs in that the drill penetrates perpendicularly for a distance and then curves, to drill through
the earth roughly parallel to the surface. The horizontal portion of
the well may stretch for thousands of feet.149
Horizontal drilling is on the rise. In the early 1980s, the industry
drilled only one horizontal well per year. 5 0 This rate increased to
over twenty-eight horizontal wells per year in 1986 and 1987, and
sixty-three such wells were drilled in 1988.51 Worldwide, about two
hundred horizontal wells were drilled in 1988.152 Horizontal drilling
remains more costly than vertical drilling and is therefore limited by
15 3
prevailing oil prices.
Horizontal drilling offers considerable benefits to oil producers.
Natural vertical fractures containing oil or natural gas, difficult to find
through traditional vertical drilling, are identified and captured much
more easily with horizontal drilling. Horizontal drilling makes it easier to control the invasion of water and other unwanted fluids in oil

149. Olivier de Montigny & Jean Combe, Hole Benefits, Reservoir Types Key to Profit,
OIL & GAS J., April 11, 1988, at 50, 54.
150. Guntis Moritis, Worldwide HorizontalDrilling Surges, OIL & GAS J., Feb. 27, 1989,
at 53, 54.
151. Id.
152. Haraldur Karlsson & Ron Bitto, Worldwide Experience Shows Horizontal Well Success, WORLD OIL, March 1989, at 51.
153. See G. Allen Petzet, OperatorsMake Wider Use of HorizontalDrilling Technology,
OIL & GAS J., Apr. 11, 1988, at 15 (initial costs are twice that of vertical wells); see also id. at
16 (noting that $16 per barrel price limits use of horizontal drilling); see also Thomas C.
Hayes, Horizontal Drilling, or How to Revive Oilfields, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1990, at 27 (national edition) (noting that horizontal drilling costs have declined but are still twice that of a
vertical well).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol23/iss4/6

38

Murray and Cross: The Case for a Texas Compulsory Unitization Statute.

1992]

TEXAS COMPULSORY UNITIZATION STATUTE

1137

fields.'5 4 Horizontal drilling also enables much greater recovery from
at least some fields.155 As recently explained in a trade journal:
Horizontal drilling's magic has included making commercial an otherwise unproducible field, turning dry holes and marginal wells into commercial producers, and eliminating other operating problems. Higher
production rates and perhaps higher ultimate recovery may result from
having several hundred to several thousand feet of reservoir exposed to
a horizontal wellbore. In a vertical well, the length of reservoir open to
56
the wellbore is limited to the thickness of the producing formation.'
The benefit of enhanced recovery from horizontal drilling is strikingly
demonstrated by wells drilled in the Austin chalk formation of south
central Texas. This area was originally drilled with vertical holes,
which initially produced oil at a rate of thirty to thirty-five barrels per
7 After being
day but quickly declined to only a few barrels per day. 15
redrilled horizontally, recovery has exceeded one-hundred fifty barrels per day.'5 "
Horizontal drilling technology can thus make enormous amounts
of additional oil available. Production rates from horizontal wells
may be four or five times as great as from traditional wells. 5 9 The
overall increase in recoverable oil is, at minimum, five percent of the
country's total theoretically recoverable reserves, or about thirty-five
billion barrels of oil. 16° This represents more than a doubling of our
proved reserves. 16 1 Moreover, while producers have conducted relatively little horizontal drilling for natural gas, "the production improvement provided by horizontal wells is higher for gas than for

154. See Jacques C. Bosio, Horizontal Wells Prove Their Worth, PETROLEUM ENG'R
INT'L, Feb. 1988, at 18.
155. B.J. Mahony, HorizontalDrilling Use on the Rise: Why and How, WORLD OIL, Oct.
1988, at 46. "Recovering 60% to 80% of hydrocarbons in place in a reservoir can be the
norm, rather than the exception, if horizontal techniques are used". Id.
156. G. Allen Petzet, OPERATORS MAKE WIDER USE OF HORIZONTAL DRILLING TECHNOLOGY, OIL & GAS J., Apr. 11, 1988, at 15.

157. Ray H. Holifield & Bill Rehm, Recompletion by Horizontal Drilling Pays Off,
Mar. 1989, at 43.

WORLD OIL,

158. Id.
159. See Thomas C. Hayes, Horizontal Drilling,or How to Revive Oilfields, N.Y. TIMES,
July 4, 1990, at 27.
160. Philip C. Crouse, Reserve Potential Due to Horizontal Drilling Is Substantial,
WORLD OIL, Oct. 1989, at 47.
161. Id.
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oil." 162
While horizontal drilling offers great promise for future recovery of
oil and gas, the present legal structures of pooling and the free market
rule of capture complicate horizontal drilling programs. Each surface
owner under whose land the horizontal drilling passes has a common
law claim to any oil produced from under the surface owner's property. If the producing operator cannot distinguish the source of the
oil produced with reasonable certainty, the operator will owe the
value of the entire recovery to each individual landowner under which
the well passed. 163 Hence, "it is very possible that the operator would
be required to account to the owners in each tract penetrated as if one
hundred percent (100%) of the production had come from each
tract." 164 This obviously creates a great risk for producers and an
associated incentive to reach a pooling agreement to apportion any
production from a horizontal well.
Moreover, horizontal drilling could entirely undermine well spacing requirements as a tool for conservation. When wells were drilled
vertically, spacing requirements could contribute to limiting overproduction from a given reservoir. With horizontal drilling, wells may be
placed artificially far apart, but any number of these wells may reach
the same small pool of oil and gas. Thus, horizontal drilling may
circumvent well spacing requirements.
In addition, the pooling rules are ill-suited to horizontal wells.
Unit size in pooling is ordinarily limited to 160 or 640 acres, but the
length of a horizontal well can far exceed this size. The railroad commission could adopt a larger unit size when necessary to accommodate situations such as horizontal drilling. Regular reliance on
railroad commission exceptions, however, is highly inefficient, because of the costs and uncertainty of the regulatory process and because the commission's judgment will be inferior to a market test.
2.

Secondary and Enhanced Recovery

Greater use of secondary and enhanced (or tertiary) recovery oper-

162. Jean-Francois Giannesini, Horizontal Drilling Is Becoming Commonplace: Here's
How It's Done, WORLD OIL, March 1989, at 36.
163. See Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. West, 508 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1974) (placing the
burden on producing party to demonstrate source of oil or gas with reasonable certainty).

164. James N. Cowden, Spacing and Pooling Considerations for Horizontal Wells 94
(May 14-15, 1990) (unpublished manuscript on file with the St. Mary's Law Journal).
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ations in oil fields is vital to the nation's energy future. We have discovered over four hundred, fifty million barrels of oil in the United
States, but only thirty-one percent of this oil will actually be extracted
under current operating methods.16 Moreover, most of this extractable oil has already been produced. One hundred, thirty billion barrels
have been produced, twenty-eight billion additional barrels are probably recoverable, and three hundred, twenty-three billion barrels will
not be produced through primary methods. 166 For some reservoirs,
only ten to twenty-five percent of the oil will be recovered through
primary production measures. 167 This is partially due to inefficient
primary production methods, as described above, but largely due to
the failure to employ advanced recovery methods, such as those that
repressurize oil fields and permit greater recovery. Use of techniques
such as secondary recovery and tertiary recovery can substantially increase the amount of oil successfully extracted from a reservoir. Indeed, the National Petroleum Council estimates that tertiary recovery
can increase our oil reserves by twice as much as all future discoveries
68
of oil.'
For the above reasons, enhanced recovery is of great value. The
need for such improved recovery is particularly important now, because much of the oil available to primary production has already
been produced. Nationwide, only about thirty billion barrels will be
produced in the future by primary methods.' 69 The Texas Conservation Committee for Unitization has observed that of the "remaining
111 billion barrels [of oil found in Texas], only 13 billion will be recovered under present economic and technological conditions."'17 0
Enhanced recovery can produce much of the remaining ninety-eight
billion barrels still in the ground.

165. Granville Dutton, A Summary on Unitization in Various States, THE LANDMAN,
June 1985, at 43.
166. NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL, ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY 9 (1984).

167. See R. V. Smith, Enhanced Oil Recovery Update: Part I - Improvement of Sweep
Efficiency, PETROLEUM ENG'R INT'L Nov. 1988 at 29.
168. Granville Dutton, A Summary on Unitization in Various States, THE LANDMAN,
June 1985, at 43.
169. TEXAS MID-CONTINENT OIL AND GAS ASSOCIATION, FIELDWIDE UNITIZATION:
VITAL TO THE FUTURE OF TEXAS 8 (1973).
170. Texas Conservation Committee for Unitization, More Oil for Texas, (1973) at 1; see
also TEXAS MID-CONTINENT OIL & GAS ASSOCIATION, Texas Energy Recovery Measure

(1973) at 2 ("Of the 145 billion barrels of oil discovered to date, 99 billion barrels will not be
recovered under current conditions.")
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Various methods are available to reinvigorate old fields and enhance recovery. Secondary recovery, for example, involves the injection of water, steam, or gas back into the reservoir to create new
pressure for the extraction of remaining oil.'
Secondary recovery
techniques are well established and have been demonstrated to be effective. While primary production from an oil field may recover as
little as ten percent of the total oil in the ground, "secondary recovery
methods will usually increase primary recovery by thirty to sixty percent and sometimes by over one hundred percent."' 7 2 However, for
some reservoirs, secondary recovery will still leave considerable oil in
the ground.' 73
Advancing technology has provided other methods for improving
recovery from oil fields. Where repressurization through secondary
recovery is insufficient to produce additional oil, other enhanced recovery processes offer potential recovery of an additional fourteen and
a half "7' 4 to fifty-two billion barrels.' 7 5 Enhanced recovery can be obtained through chemical methods, such as polymer flooding (addition
of polymers to reinjection water to increase oil mobility); surfactant
flooding (addition of surface active chemicals to reinjection water to
increase oil mobility); and alkaline flooding (addition of alkaline
chemicals to reinjection water to increase oil mobility). 76 These
methods offer recovery of an additional 2.5 billion barrels of oil that
otherwise would be lost. 17 Other methods include miscible flooding
through the injection of carbon dioxide to reduce oil trapped in the
ground.17 81 Miscible methods can recover up to 5.5 billion barrels of
oil. 179 In situ combustion (igniting heavy, sticky oil in reservoirs to

171. See generally STEPHEN L. McDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 21-22 (1971).
172. John C. LaMaster, Consent Requirements in Compulsory Fieldwide Unitization, 46
LA. L. REV. 843, 844 (1986).
173. See NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL, ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY

10 (1984).

"Certain reservoir types, such as those with very viscous crude oils and some low-permeability
carbonate.., reservoirs, respond poorly to conventional secondary recovery techniques". Id.
174. See R. V. Smith, Enhanced Oil Recovery Update: Part 4-Surfactant and Alkaline
Flooding, and EOR's Future, 61 PETROLEUM ENG'R INT'L 44, 46 (1989).
175. V. A. Kuuskraa, Current and Future Economics of Enhanced Oil Recovery, in INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF EARTH AND MAN, ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY FOR THE IN-

DEPENDENT PRODUCER 261, 264 (1984).
176. See NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL, ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY 12-16 (1984).

177. See id.at 61.
178. See id.at 16.
179. See id.at 61.
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enhance pressure) 181 can provide recovery of up to eighty percent of
the oil in a reservoir.' 8 ' Where enhanced recovery operations have
been undertaken in Texas, they have yielded substantial amounts of
oil. 182 Future technological developments in enhanced recovery
promise additional billions of barrels of oil production.' 83
Unitization is essential for maximum efficient use of enhanced recovery operations. In the absence of unitization, free-rider problems
preclude commencement of enhanced recovery. Reinjection can be a
relatively expensive operation. Once a single party bears all the reinjection costs, however, anyone overlying the reservoir may take advantage of the newly-created pressure to produce oil or gas. Again,
the present system creates a substantial disincentive for action and an
incentive to take advantage of the production actions of others. Indeed, free riders could be so parasitical as to withdraw the reinjected
gas itself and still be within the bounds of the law. Alternatively, with
unitization, other rights owners may be able to sue the operator conducting secondary recovery operations for trespass or other torts.'84
Unitization is critical to enhanced recovery for other, noneconomic
reasons as well. For example, for reinjection to function efficiently,
the injection must occur at specific sites in a reservoir. These optimum sites may be outside the control of the party willing to undertake the costs of reinjection operations. Because, "the location of
these wells must be altered by surface property lines to avoid drainage
and protect correlative rights, the profitability of such [secondary re-

180. See 1 RAYMOND M. MYERS, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION: VOLUNTARY COMPULSORY § 2.05 (2d ed. 1967). Some "oil in its natural state will not flow through
the oil sands" and that in situ combustion can "heat the oil in the horizon to increase its
mobility by decreasing its viscosity". Id.; see also NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL, ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY 18 (1984).
181. See STEPHEN L. McDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 22 (1971).
182. See TEXAS MID-CONTINENT OIL & GAS ASS'N, Unitization: Key to Future Energy
Supplies (1973) at 11-12. The benefits from unitization are applicable to a number of Texas
reservoirs, including the Kelly-Snyder field (water injection increased recoverable reserves by
932 million barrels), the Wasson field (offering increased recovery of 562 million barrels with
increasing production from 27,000 barrels per day to 81,000 barrels per day), the Fullerton
field (with increased recovery of 159 million barrels), and other reservoirs. Id.
183. See 1989 IOCC ANNUAL REPORT at 38 ("arguing that evolving production technologies not allow recovery of presently unproducible domestic oil").
184. See 2 BRUCE M. KRAMER & PATRICK H. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND
UNITIZATION § 22.01 (2d ed. 1957).
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'
covery] projects may dwindle or even vanish." 185
Unitization also can
"result in improved recovery techniques based on more adequate
knowledge of reservoir characteristics." ' 18 6 Early unitization permits
enhanced recovery to occur at the time that is optimum for maximum
recovery and avoids waste throughout the production cycle of a

field. 187
Unitization alone could avoid the deterrents to enhanced recovery
and promote efficient operations by aligning private interests with that
of society as a whole. In the process, substantially greater amounts of
oil and gas will be produced. 8 ' The Texas Conservation Committee
for Unitization has estimated that "[b]y unitizing these fields and producing oil from wells that will yield the most oil, ultimate recovery
can often be doubled or tripled."' 8 9 In one Florida field, projections
indicated that "without unitization only seventeen per cent of the oil
in place (120 million barrels) would be recovered, while under a unitized operation ultimate recovery will almost triple to slightly less than
fifty percent of the oil in place (approximately 337 million
barrels)."' 190
Without unitization, however, relatively little enhanced recovery
can profitably occur. An American Bar Association committee report
found:
It is only through unit operation that the logical and complete application of present technical knowledge of oil and gas conservation can be
accomplished. It is only through unit operation of a common source of
supply that individual property rights can be fully protected. It is only
through unit operation that the maximum recovery can be achieved and

185. WALLACE F. LovEoY & PAUL T. HOMAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF OIL CONSERVATION REGULATION 199 (1967).

186. TEXAS MID-CONTINENT OIL & GAS ASSOCIATION, Fieldwide Unitization: Vital to
the Future of Texas 11 (1973). Describing the benefits of pooling individual operator informa-

tion on "geologic conditions, reservoir thickness, continuity, permeability, porosity and texture, water, oil and gas content throughout the reservoir, subsurface pressures, and well
produceability". Id.
187. Id.; see also 2 ERNEST E. SMITH & JAQUELINE L. WEAVER, TEXAS LAW OF OIL
AND GAS § 8.2(D) (3d ed. 1990).
188. See John C. LaMaster, Consent Requirements in Compulsory Fieldwide Unitization,
46 LA. L. REV. 843, 844 (secondary recovery methods and fieldwide unitization can increase
production to over one hundred percent).
189. Texas Conservation Committee for Unitization, MORE OIL FOR TEXAS (1973) at 1.
190. Robert L.Mellen III, Note, Compulsory Unitization in Florida: A New Emphasis in
the Energy Crisis?, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 196, 206 (1974).
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the maximum rate of daily production maintained.' 91
A treatise on oil and gas law stressed that only a "limited and inefficient water flood program may be carried on without unitization" and
"it is practically impossible to carry on an extensive gas injection project without unitization."' 192 Indeed, at the present time only six percent of the nation's oil production comes from enhanced recovery
methods. 19 3 Increased unitization is essential to the maximum effi-

cient use of enhanced recovery procedures. Conducting a secondary
recovery operation on a field without unitization may even make an
operator liable to other rights owners overlying a reservoir. 194
Unitization alone is insufficient to provide the tens of billions of
barrels available from enhanced recovery procedures. These methods
are expensive and their promise will depend upon oil price levels. 195
At any given price level, however, the efficiencies of unitization will
permit considerably more enhanced recovery to occur and to profit
operators. This in turn offers considerable societal benefits, including
reduced levels of oil imports, ripple-out benefits to related industries,
and increased government revenues.196 In addition, the National Petroleum Council has suggested that "[d]evelopment of [enhanced oil
recovery] provides more7 time for transition from oil and gas to alter19
nate energy sources."'

D. Regulatory Inefficiencies

In the absence of unitization, the state of Texas has established a
convoluted, Rube Goldberg-type machine for petroleum and natural
gas conservation. The railroad commission has a variety of tools in its
191. A.B.A. ASS'N COMM. OF THE SECTION OF MINERAL LAW, quoted in Myers.
192. RAYMOND M. MYERS, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION § 206 (6) (1st.
ed. 1967). Myers explained further:
The input and production wells must be located in accordance with the best engineering
practice and the field operated as a whole. If not, the location of an input well on one
tract would displace wet gas on a neighboring tract and an offset producing well would
drain from the tract with resulting damages and litigation.

Id.
193. See

NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL, ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY 3

(1984).

194. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Alexander, 622 S.W.2d 563, 568 (Tex. 1981) (lessors successfully sued lessee where injections produced drainage of oil from under lessors' property)

195. See

NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL, ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY

66-71 (discuss-

ing the sensitivity of various methods to oil price).
196. See id. at 94.
197. Id.
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possession for facilitating efficient conservation, but none of these
tools addresses the root causes of the inefficiencies of the unregulated
market. The commission may tinker with proration formulae and
other controls to try to encourage efficient behavior, but these methods are imprecise and create their own sources of inefficiency.
Perhaps one of the greatest benefits of unitization is the extent to
which it obviates the need for much of the regulatory structure currently used in oil and gas law. Some of the existing regulation may
distort efficient operations, even as it seeks to encourage them. For
example, regulators may limit the ratio of gas to oil produced from a
well, in an attempt to preserve reservoir pressure and enhance ultimate recovery, or to prohibit the flaring of gas in the absence of secondary recovery operations. Yet when regulators seek to force
secondary recovery, they may actually increase economic inefficiency
by forcing distorted production patterns.1 9 Through the marketplace, individual operators can choose those secondary recovery operations that are economically efficient and, with unitization, the
operators can choose those that are also for society.
In addition, regulation inevitably involves costs to the government
and the public. Under current laws, "the dockets of the regulatory
authorities are filled with hundreds of cases, many of which are litigated in the courts, and the costs are eventually paid by the public. ' "'99 The regulation of oil-gas ratios alone "imposes significant
testing and administrative costs on operators and on the commission
because of the large number of existing wells." 2" Unitization, by invoking private interest for overall societal benefit, can avoid the need
for so much regulatory attention to oil and gas production from individual fields. For example, "[u]nitization obviates the necessity for a
regulatory authority to restrict the rate of output from a reservoir and
to allocate the reservoir allowable among operators, thus in another
198. See STEPHEN L. McDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 204 (1971). McDonald observes that "regulation as prac-

ticed regarding associated gas may at best reduce the wastes of free competitive extraction
without eliminating them altogether (as with volumetrically equal withdrawal of gas and oil),
and at worst actually create wastes that are greater than those averted (as with forced uneconomical reinjection." Id.
199. RAYMOND M. MYERS, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION 208 (1st ed.

1967).
200.

JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS

331

(1986).
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way saving administrative and compliance costs." ''
V.

THE STATUS OF UNITIZATION IN TEXAS

Notwithstanding the considerable economic, psychological, and
legal obstacles to unitization in Texas, considerable unitization of oil
fields has somehow occurred. While precise data is unavailable,
thousands of fields have been unitized, and it appears that at least
forty-eight percent of Texas oil production comes from unitized operations. 20 2 As a consequence the "percentage of oil produced from secondary recovery operations in Texas has steadily increased from
about 25 percent in 1960 to 53 percent in 1970, to about 60 percent in
1976 through 1979. "2o3 Unitization agreements have provided an ad-

ditional seventeen billion barrels of recoverable oil.2 "4 Most large oil
fields in the state have been unitized.20 5
This extent of unitization should not make one sanguine, however,
about the present state of Texas law. Significant problems remain.
First, the rate of new unitization has begun to decline. 20 6 Second,
unitization has proved difficult in relatively smaller fields that could
be profitably unitized. 207 Third, much of the unitization is only partial, rather than fieldwide,2 °8 and partial unitization "is not as efficient
as fieldwide unitization in reducing drilling and operating costs, nor
as productive in terms of increasing ultimate recovery. ' ' 2°9 Fourth,
the unitization that has occurred has not been timely and has taken
210
years to adopt.
201. STEPHEN L. MCDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 208 (1971).
202. See JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS
316 (1986).
203. Id. at 317.
204, Id.
205, Of the 207 largest oil fields in the state, 117 have unitized secondary recovery operations. See id. at 322.
206. JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS 322

(1986).
207. See id. at 324.
208. See id. at 319 (finding that out of all Texas oil production, merely 20 percent comes
from fieldwide units). One single field is divided into 25 separate units. Id.
209. Id. Partial unitization also "brings with it additional administrative, legal, and operating costs to the unit, as well as an increased administrative burden on the commission to
resolve conflicts between those inside and those outside the unit." Id. at 329.
210. See JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS
318 (1986).
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In addition, Texas unitization suffers from a more serious legal
problem. The reason for the substantial number of unitization
projects is that the railroad commission has adopted a form of quasicompulsory unitization. The commission has employed those compulsory conservation powers that it does possess in order to pressure
parties into "voluntary" unitization. Thus, the commission has
proved "willing and able to arm-twist operators into cooperating
through show-cause hearings, no-flare orders, reduced gas-oil ratios,
and lower field MERs.

' 2 11

For example, the commission will offer an

enhanced MER or an improved gas-oil ratio if parties agree to unitize
a reservoir.
The railroad commission's unofficial "backdoor" pressure on private parties to unitize voluntarily represents a poor compromise. The
commission's actions are legally questionable so long as the state legislature has rejected a compulsory unitization statute. Professor
Weaver, a noted authority, has described the prevailing policy as
"precariously perched" and "legally tenuous. ' 212 Whatever the efficiency benefits of unitization, democratic values demand that it be
conducted honestly and openly and subject to constitutional checks
and balances.
In addition, the commission's quasi-compulsory unitization is a
very inefficient, awkward method for providing the benefits of unitized operations. The unofficial and unsystematic manner of quasicompulsory unitization introduces new costs and delays. Such actions tend to produce "less-efficient and less-productive partial unitization" and still yield the "expense and delay of negotiating
voluntary agreements.

'2 13

The commission's "arm-twisting" pro-

duced a unitization agreement for the Bryan (Woodbine) field, but
only after years of excessive drilling and waste of ultimate recovery.214
Moreover, the unofficial forcing of unitization will yield a less than
equitable distribution of benefits among rights owners. 2 15 Finally, the

commission's ability to pressure parties to unitize may decline as its
various regulatory tools offer less power over operators in the

211.
212.
213.
214.
(1986).
215.

Id. at 336.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 323.
JACQUELINE

L.

WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS

326

See id. at 333.
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future.2 16
VI.

STRUCTURING A TEXAS COMPULSORY UNITIZATION
STATUTE

Given the substantial benefits of unitization and the failure of existing legal structures to provide for sufficient unitization, the adoption of a compulsory unitization statute is the only logical action.
Merely adopting a statute labelled "compulsory unitization," however, will no more guarantee necessary unitization than did the War
on Poverty eliminate poverty. This section addresses the principles
that should be incorporated into an effective compulsory unitization
statute.
A.

The Importance of Properly Structured Statutory Authority

Experience in other states reveals the potential inadequacies of theoretically compulsory unitization statutes. Oklahoma has had a compulsory unitization statute since 1945, but Texas has a higher
percentage of unitized reservoirs and more secondary recovery opera-

tions than does Oklahoma.217 Mississippi has a compulsory unitization statute but it "has been singularly unsuccessful, as evidenced by
'
the fact that it was utilized only once between 1964 and 1972. 218
Florida has had a compulsory unitization statute since 1945, but due
to lack of enforcement only two oil fields in Florida have been

unitized.21 9
The relative failure of many compulsory unitization statutes can be
traced to their language. Many such laws place procedural roadblocks on the path to unitization and fail to provide for the full range
of benefits offered by unitized operation. Most compulsory unitiza216. See id. at 347.
The problem is, however, that the commission's bag of tools is no longer as useful as it
once was. With most fields at 100% MERs, the commission cannot promise increased
"carrots" to operators as a reward for unitization without injuring the field. Discovery
allowables, capacity allowables for water flooding, and increases in a field's MER no
longer can function as incentives to channel private investment decisions into desirable
types of activity.

Id.
217. See id.at 316.
218. See John C. LaMaster, Consent Requirements in Compulsory Fieldwide Unitization,
46 LA. L. REv. 843, 843 (1986) (summarizing the rule of capture).
219. See Robert L. Mellen III, Note, Compulsory Unitization in Florida: A New Emphasis
in the Energy Crisis, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 196, 206 (1974).
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tion statutes suffer from a fundamental conceptual flaw. These statutes provide for unitization to preserve ultimate recovery or to
conduct secondary recovery but do not enable other efficient uses of
unitization, such as for reduced drilling costs. 220 Such "[u]nnecessary
restriction of the legitimate purposes of unitization unnecessarily lim22 1
its the growth of unitization and consequent benefits."
Compulsory unitization statutes in most states also contain a variety of substantive and procedural prerequisites to unitization that unduly delay unitized operations or preclude them altogether. In many
states, unitization can be compelled only after a majority of rights
owners petition for such action. Indeed, some states require approval
by seventy-five percent, or more, of the owners overlying a reservoir. 222 While obtaining seventy-five percent approval to petition for
compulsory unitization is more simple than obtaining the one hundred percent approval that may be necessary for voluntary unitization, uncooperative landowners still have the power to stall the
compulsory process.2 23 A recent review of state compulsory unitization laws has found that obtaining consent is impeded by "logistical
problems of identifying the parties who need to consent and then
physically obtaining that consent. ' 224 Risk averse parties may also
decline the consent required in compulsory unitization statutes.2 25
Determining the existence of the required approval percentage may

220. See,

JACQUELINE

L.

WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS

338 (1986) (noting that few states authorize forming of exploratory units to save drilling expenses"). Unitization states "anticipate only one type of benefit: increased ultimate recovery"
and do not consider such benefits as "saving of well and equipment expense, optimizing the

time-distribution of recovery, facilitating waste disposal, obviating the necessity for certain
detailed regulations." STEPHEN L. MCDONALD, PETROLEUM
UNITED STATES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 226 (1971).

CONSERVATION

IN THE

221. STEPHEN L. MCDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 226 (1971).
222. See

JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS

338 (1986).
223. John C. LaMaster, Consent Requirements in Compulsory Fieldwide Unitization, 46
LA. L. REV. 843, 843 (1986). "While it certainly is easier to obtain consent of between sixty
and eighty percent of the parties involved than it is to obtain 100% consent, there are still
many difficulties involved in obtaining consent"); Robert L. Mellen III, Note, Compulsory
Unitization in Florida: A New Emphasis in the Energy Crisis, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 196, 202
(1974) "Experience has proved that the complexity of such an agreement ensures that unanimity, and in many cases, mere substantial agreement, will not result".
224. See John C. LaMaster, Consent Requirements in Compulsory Fieldwide Unitization,
46 LA. L. REV. 843 (1986) (summarizing the rule of capture).
225. See id. at 867.
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itself be confounded by different methods of measuring ownership
percentages, title disputes, encumbrances, and other features.22 6
In addition to requiring majority consent for unitization, most statutes also require a showing that unitization would produce a substantially increased recovery, or proof of the exact amount of efficiency
benefits from unitization, or proof of that unitization is cost beneficial.227 Burdens of proof are placed upon the proponents of com-'
pelled unitization. Because of all these requirements, the "unitization
process in states with compulsory laws often is marked by long delays
and still results in less-than-fieldwide units."22 Some state commissions lack any authority to initiate compulsory unitization processes
and placing the "burden of initiative and persuasion on private operators" involves time and expense that "at best delays and at worst prohibits desirable unitization projects."2'2 9 In a major Florida field, a
small minority (three percent of working interest owners and sixteen
percent of royalty owners' interests) blocked unitization for so long
that they "placed the recovery of nearly 200 million barrels of oil in
danger because of decreasing reservoir pressures. "230
In short, many compulsory unitization laws provide for little actual
unitization. The best of the current state laws appears to be that of
Louisiana, which can serve as a point of departure in our search for
the optimal compulsory unitization legislation. 23 In 1940, Louisiana
enacted a law permitting the state commissioner to compel unitization
for secondary recovery.23 2 This law contained no minimum consent
requirement for compulsory unitization. In 1960, Louisiana expanded upon the law to provide for compulsory unitization for primary recovery, though this amendment contained a seventy-five
percent consent requirement.2 aa The Louisiana law has only a partial

226. See id. at 851-62.
227. See generally id. at 847-49 (summarizing the requirements of most compulsory unitization statutes).

228.

JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS

338

(1986).

229.

STEPHEN L. McDoNALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES:

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 226 (1971).
230. Robert L. Mellen III, Note, Compulsory Unitization in Florida: A New Emphasis in
the Energy Crisis?, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 196, 209 (1974).
231. See WALLACE F. LOVEJOY & PAUL T. HOMAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF OIL CONSERVATION REGULATION 272 (1967) (citing Louisiana as state most favorable to unitization).

232. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:5(B) (West 1989).
233. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:5(C) (West 1989).
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consent requirement and is unique among states in permitting unitization for prevention of economic waste from excessive drilling, in addition to physical waste from loss of pressurization.2 34
The theoretical superiority of the Louisiana compulsory unitization
law has produced effective results in practical application as well. In
1982, sixty-four percent of Louisiana's production of oil came from
unitized fields, as opposed to approximately forty-eight percent of
Texas oil production. 23 5 Louisiana's oil wells are, on average, one
third more productive than those of Texas.2 36 A substantial percentage (sixty-seven percent) of Louisiana's oil fields are unitized early,
for primary recovery.2 37 Following the passage of the 1940 compulsory unitization law, Louisiana's total crude oil production increased
far more rapidly than in any other major producing state.2 38 Following passage of the 1960 compulsory unitization amendments, Louisiana's production again increased far faster than in other states.2 39
Prior to the 1960 amendments, only four secondary recovery operations existed in Louisiana, "but once the bill became effective activity
' 24
increased rapidly to over 100 injection projects per year. 0
1. No Prerequisite Showings for Unitization
Because the present Texas system contains a presumption against
unitization, most unitization statutes require a set of prerequisite
showings by a party before unitization can be compelled. These statutes generally require a regulatory finding that unitization is "reasonably necessary" to achieve some legitimate statutory purpose, that the
planned operation is "feasible," that unitization "will result in additional production exceeding in value the estimated additional cost of

234. See STEPHEN L. MCDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 226 (1971).
235. JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS 315-16
(1986).
236. Id. at 316.
237. Id. at 318.
238. See 1988 Energy Statistics Sourcebook at 79 (from 1940-1949, Louisiana production
increased over 85%, Texas and California production increased by approximately 50%,
Oklahoma production declined by 3%).
239. See id. at 81 (from 1960-1969, Louisiana production increased by 110%, Texas production increased by about 20%, Oklahoma production increased by nearly 15%, and California production increased by almost 25%).
240. Granville Dutton, A Summary on Unitization in Various States, THE LANDMAN,
June 1985, at 45.
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unitization," and that the operation is "for the common good and is
fair and equitable. ' 241 Even the Interstate Oil Compact Commission
model statute retains two of these findings.242 While such showings
are usually possible, they inevitably require costly legal work, expert
witnesses, time, and other resources. 21 3 Although unitization hearings are often rather brief, this is primarily because "the unit proponents have spent many months, and often many years, securing near'
unanimity." 244
Most of the showings required by the existing unitization statutes
are either unjustified or obviously unnecessary. The free market can
take care of most concerns. Parties involved in unitization have no
incentive to undertake projects, such as secondary recovery, that are
not "reasonably necessary" or that are not "feasible." Nor would
such parties undertake operations that are not cost beneficial. The
free market is surely a better long-run judge of reasonable necessity
and feasibility than is a government commission. In addition, as previously discussed, the unitized operations will ordinarily be more efficient and productive than non-unitized operations. Rather than
requiring such showings before unitization, the law should require
special showings for non-unitized production.
There remains a legitimate fairness concern. The free market cannot be counted upon to ensure that a unitization plan is equitable.
Yet even superficial fairness should not be a prerequisite to unitization. First, unitization inherently allows greater fairness than nonunitization, which permits structurally advantaged parties to take the oil
of their neighbors. Second, even if a unitization plan is structured
unfairly, this inequity can be corrected retroactively at a later date.
The existence of unitized efficiencies should not await the ideal plan,
for even greater and less remediable unfairness will result during that
wait.

241. 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 111 (1989).
242. See JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS
17-18 (1986).
243. Presenting a unitization proposal typically requires at least the detailed testimony of
a geologist, a petroleum engineer, a landman or an attorney, as well as the attendant prepared
materials and legal filings. See 1 RAYMOND M. MYERS, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION 242-47 (2d ed. 1967) (discussing the Oklahoma statute).
244. JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS

329

(1986).
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2. Promote Early Unitization
An effective compulsory unitization statute should be structured so
as to encourage unitization as early in a reservoir's productive life as
possible. Unitization traditionally has been perceived as useful primarily for secondary recovery operations. Yet the earlier the implementation of unitization, the less waste in drilling costs, the less
reduction of ultimate production, and the greater protection of correlative rights results.245 Early unitization also can enable optimum production rates from an early stage in the reservoir.246
Early unitization requires that the commission be authorized to initiate unitization even in the absence of an application from the parties.
Soon after notification of any new discovery, the commission should
prepare unitization. Professor McDonald has suggested that
"[s]tatutes and regulations should go beyond mere encouragement
and facilitation; they should require unitization of every oil reservoir
within a reasonable time following discovery. 2 47 Louisiana provides
this authority in some circumstances.248 Unitization must await some
definition of reservoir size, but this need not be done precisely. Again,
any errors in the original assignment of reservoir scope can be corrected in some subsequent damages hearing.
3. Require Fieldwide Unitization
The essential benefit from unitization requires that an entire reservoir be operated cooperatively. At the present time, much unitization
in Texas is less than fieldwide, which loses much of the efficiency benefit of the procedure.2 49 Other state's statutes also provide for less
than full unitization.250 Less than fieldwide unitization produces "additional administrative, legal, and operating costs to the unit as well
as an increased administrative burden on the commission to resolve
245. See 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 438 (1989).
246. See STEPHEN L. McDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE

UNITED

STATES: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 205-06 (1971).

247. Stephen L. McDonald, Unit Operation of Oil Reservoirs as an Instrument of Conservation, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 305 (1973).
248. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:128, 129 (West 1989).
249. See JACQUELINE L. WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS
319 (1986).
250. See 6 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 122.4-122.5 (1989).
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While

partial unitization is preferable to none, there remains an inefficient
production incentive between those within and those outside the unit.
Partial unitization also may injure correlative rights.25 2 Nor is there
any rational economic basis for less than fieldwide unitization. Commission-compelled unitization as soon as the scope of the reservoir is
defined should force fieldwide units. Elimination of the consent requirement will go far toward eliminating the source of partial
unitizations.
4. Release from Production Regulations
Another important component of a compulsory unitization law
would be to release the participants from most other state production
restrictions, including well spacing rules, production ratios and MER
limits. Implementation of these regulations costs government and private resources and introduces some inefficiencies into efficient market
production. With unitization, the restrictions become unnecessary,
because the producing unit no longer has an economic incentive to
over-produce. Unitization is a solution to the rule of capture, and
"private pursuit of profit under unitization substitutes for regulation
in all respects except that pertaining to external damages.

' 25 3

Elimi-

nation of these other regulatory inhibitions should also help encourage participation in unitization.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Compulsory unitization has been vigorously resisted by various sectors of the oil production industry. This resistance has been particularly pronounced in Texas. The basis for much of this resistance
appears to be a sense that compelled unitization is a "socialistic" intrusion upon free enterprise. This is ironic because compulsory unitization is the sort of government action that actually enhances free
market efficiency and is far more efficient and market-oriented than
the set of production regulations imposed upon the oil business to
251.

JAQUELINE

L.

WEAVER, UNITIZATION OF OIL AND GAS FIELDS IN TEXAS

329

(1986).
252. See Maurice H. Merrill, Implied Covenants, Conservation and Unitization, 2 OKLA.
L. REV. 469, 480 (1949) (suggesting that a unit should contain "all land overlying the common
reservoir" and that this may be required by state constitutions on fairness grounds).
253. STEPHEN L. McDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 226 (1971).
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prevent waste. While unitization forces cooperation among producers, it permits those groups of producers greater freedom in exploration and production decisions.
Compulsory unitization is a rare example of a government action
that will enhance both efficiency and equity. In so doing, unitization
offers considerable societal benefits as well. Professor McDonald
summarized these advantages, writing:
[Compulsory unitization] would harness the ingenuity, enterprise, and
energy of profit-motivated businessmen in the interest of society as a
whole, and would permit the flexible adjustment of current vs. future
recovery under changing circumstances. Second, by holding out to explorers the prospect of being able to develop and produce new discoveries on the most economical terms, it would encourage exploration and
contribute to solving the problem, now referred to as the "energy crisis," of equating supplies of oil and gas with growing demand in the
years ahead. Third, it would result in true protection of correlative
rights. And fourth, it would allow us to dispense with all of the elaborate and expensive machinery of present detailed regulation except that
necessary to restrain drilling and production in the preunitization period of information-gathering and to protect the environment from
drilling and producing activities."'
Society has foregone many of these benefits for decades. As recoverable oil and gas supplies dwindle, however, the benefits of unitization
become more vital for the welfare of the nation and of the state.
Adoption of a strong and effective compulsory unitization statute is
increasingly essential.

254. Stephen L. McDonald, Unit Operation of Oil Reservoirs as an Instrument of Conser-

vation, 49

NOTRE DAME LAW.

305, 312 (1973).
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